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“There is nothing which so generally strikes the 
imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the 
right of property.”1 
Sir William Blackstone, 1765. 
 
“[T]he Sovereign has a greater right over the property of 
his subjects, where the public good is concerned, than the 
owners themselves have.”2 
Hugo Grotius, 1625. 
 
“[T]he doctrine of eminent domain is diametrically 
opposed to the law of God—the law of nature—and 
embodies the very antithesis of the unalienable right of 
private property.”3 
Gerald R. Thompson, 1990. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Across the nation, economic turmoil and the collapse of the housing 
market have plunged countless homeowners into financial peril.4  
Communities large and small have watched foreclosure signs spring up and 
have seen the “American Dream” become increasingly elusive.5  Homes are 
now worth only a fraction of what families paid, leaving them with hefty 
mortgage payments for value that simply is not there.6  Some residents find 
that their only option is to walk away, defaulting on their debts and severely 
damaging both their personal credit and the stability of the local economy.7 
 
 1.  2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.  
 2.  HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 5 (n.p., Kessinger Publishing 2004) 
(1625), available at, http://www.constitution.org/gro/djbp_101.htm. 
 3.  Gerald R. Thompson, The Unalienable Right of Property: Examining the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments, 8 J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 189, 202 (1990). 
 4.  See infra Part II.A (summarizing the history of the financial crisis). 
 5.  See infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text. 
 6.  See infra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 7.  See infra note 197. 
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Leaders in these communities struggle to provide aid to their 
constituents, usually with little to no success.8  They feel their pleas fall on 
deaf ears at the state and federal levels, leaving them to shoulder the burden 
alone.9  Government and bank programs provide limited relief, but many 
remain desperately in need of help.10 
And desperate times can call for desperate measures.  It is in this climate 
of desperation that some political leaders have turned to unorthodox 
solutions, willing to take bold action to solve the problems plaguing their 
citizens.11  Unbridled boldness, however, does not make a solution the right 
one.  No matter how tempting the proposals marketed by outsiders seem to a 
vulnerable and desperate community, it is important that the consequences 
and limitations of those actions be realistically considered.  This Comment 
aims to investigate the legal and practical implications of one of the more 
radical plans under consideration. 
Specifically, it will dissect the controversial new eminent domain 
proposal engineered by the investment firm Mortgage Resolution Partners 
(MRP).  The firm hopes to utilize the eminent domain power of local 
municipalities as a creative solution to the recent collapse of the U.S. 
housing market.12  This Comment will study the proposal as applied in the 
case of San Bernardino County (S.B. County).  Although S.B. County is just 
one of the municipalities that have entertained the eminent domain proposal, 
this county is “ground zero” for the proposal—until recently, it was “widely 
considered to be the local government furthest along in considering the 
proposal.”13  Although the proposal appears to be presently “off the table” in 
S.B. County,14 the saga surrounding its potential application there is the ideal 
case study for thoroughly analyzing the factual and legal issues involved. 
Part II provides a brief look at the history of the current financial crisis 
 
 8.  See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, 405–06 (2011), 
available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf; 
Kevin Jursinski, The Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis in Florida: A 21st Century Solution, 84 FLA. B.J. 
91, 92 (2010). 
 9.  See infra Part II.C–E.  
 10.  See infra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
 11.  See infra Part II.C. 
 12.  See infra Part II.C (outlining MRP’s proposal). 
 13.  Alejandro Lazo, Lt. Gov. Gavin Newsom Alleges ‘Threats’ Against Mortgage Plan, L.A. 
TIMES (Sept. 11, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/11/business/la-fi-eminent-domain-
20120911. 
 14.  See infra Part II.E. 
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and its effect on S.B. County’s local economy; it then walks through the 
proposed eminent domain plan.  Part III provides some of the relevant legal 
background.  Part IV examines the lawfulness of the mortgage 
condemnation proposal on the state level.  Part V measures the proposal 
against the various protections of the U.S. Constitution.  Part VI addresses 
the impact and significance of the proposal, and Part VII outlines the current 
state of the issue and briefly concludes. 
II.  HISTORY 
A.  The History of the Financial Crisis 
In 2007 and 2008, the burst of the American “housing bubble” prompted 
the country’s longest economic downturn since World War II.15  Economic 
and legal commentators present competing theories on how and why the 
American housing and financial markets collapsed.16  These suggested 
causes, to name but a few, include the nation’s misguided monetary policy, a 
global savings surplus, government policies encouraging affordable 
homeownership, irrational consumer expectations of rising housing prices, 
and an inelastic housing supply.17 
In May of 2009, Congress created the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission (FCIC) to officially “examine the financial and economic crisis 
. . . and explain its causes to the American people.”18  The FCIC’s published 
 
 15.  Business Cycle Dating Committee Report, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH 1 (Sept. 20, 
2010), http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.pdf.  The committee determined that the original 
recession, which began in December of 2007, ended eighteen months later, in June of 2009.  Id. 
 16.  See, e.g., Major Coleman IV et al., Subprime Lending and the Housing Bubble: Tail Wags 
Dog?, 17 J. HOUSING ECON. 272 (2008) (proposing that the housing bubble was caused jointly by 
the subprime market, house price increases, and the changing institutional, political, and regulatory 
environment of the time); Edward L. Glaeser et al., Can Cheap Credit Explain the Housing Boom?, 
in HOUSING AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 301 (Edward L. Glaeser  & Todd Sinai eds., 2013) (finding 
that low interest rates explain only one-fifth of the rise in home prices); Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. 
Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177 (2012) (positing a supply-side cause 
to the crisis); Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Victims or 
Villains?, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 733 (2010) (explaining the roles that Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac played in the crisis and noting specifically that extreme increases in residential 
mortgage defaults triggered the recession in 2008). 
 17.  Levitin & Wachter, supra note 16, at 1179–80. 
 18.  See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 8, at xv.  Unfortunately, even the 
congressional report does not provide a definitive opinion: four of the ten members dissented from 
[Vol. 41: 633, 2014] Treading Water 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
637 
report concluded that the crisis was avoidable, the result of “human action 
and inaction,” and named as contributing causes: (1) failures in financial 
regulation and supervision;19 (2) failures of corporate governance and risk 
management at key financial institutions; and (3) a combination of excessive 
borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency.20  It also accused the 
federal government of being “ill prepared” and blamed its “inconsistent 
response” for contributing to uncertainty and panic in the financial 
markets.21 
The one thing that commentators can agree on, however, is that one of 
the greatest contributors to this economic collapse was the failure of the 
mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) market.22  MBSs are asset-backed 
interests secured by a mortgage or, more frequently, a number of mortgages 
in a pool.23  First issued in the 1970s, they have traditionally been used as a 
means for smaller financial institutions to reduce the inherent risks of 
mortgage lending by selling their interests as mortgagees to the investing 
public.24  For these mortgage originators, the MBS system was a proverbial 
 
the report’s conclusions.  Id. at 411–39. 
  In an interesting twist, FCIC chairman Phil Angelides originally became the executive 
chairman of Mortgage Resolution Partners, the investment firm behind the eminent domain scheme 
discussed in this Comment.  Matthew Goldstein & Jennifer Ablan, Exclusive: Angelides to Lead 
Distressed Mortgage Firm, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/13/us-
usa-housing-angelides-idUSTRE80C26820120113 [hereinafter Goldstein & Ablan, Angelides to 
Lead Distressed Mortgage Firm]; see also infra notes 56–66 and accompanying text (discussing the 
eminent domain proposal).  This appointment was controversial primarily because, in its fundraising 
materials, Mortgage Resolution Partners touted its ability to use its “secret formula” of “legal and 
political leverage” in negotiating its deals with municipalities.  Matthew Goldstein & Jennifer Ablan, 
Phil Angelides Gives Up His “Secret Formula”, REUTERS (Feb. 13, 2012), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/unstructuredfinance/2012/02/13/phil-angelides-gives-up-his-secret-formula/ 
[hereinafter Goldstein, Phil Angelides Gives Up His “Secret Formula”] (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Angelides eventually resigned from his position with the investment firm.  See infra notes 
83–87 and accompanying text (describing the political objection to this relationship).   
 19.  FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 8, at xvii–xviii (specifically citing failures by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York).   
 20.  Id. at xvi–xx. 
 21.  Id. at xxi. 
 22.  See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime 
Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257, 1259 (2009). 
 23.  See Ronald Greenspan & William Nolan, Description of the Mortgage and Asset-Backed 
Securities Markets, Roles of Principal Participants and Key Terms, in MORTGAGE AND ASSET 
BACKED SECURITIES LITIGATION HANDBOOK § 1:1 (Talcott J. Franklin & Thomas F. Nealon III 
eds., 2012). 
 24.  Id.; see also Times Topics: Mortgage-Backed Securities, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.ny 
[Vol. 41: 633, 2014] Treading Water 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
638 
golden goose—by selling their mortgage interests for inclusion in MBS 
pools, they would receive immediate revenue from mortgages (instead of 
waiting years for full payment) while completely avoiding the risk of the 
homeowner defaulting; with that money in hand, the originators could make 
new loans to prospective homeowners, and begin the cycle again.25 
For decades, these MBSs were viewed as extremely safe investments.26  
As this “secondary mortgage market”27 grew, the MBSs became more 
complicated in form, more companies began to securitize mortgages, and the 
lending standards of the underlying mortgages began to fall.28  Investment 
banks began to issue their own “private label” MBSs (PLSs) that comprised 
“nonconforming” or “subprime” loans with reduced underwriting 
standards—loans not guaranteed by government-sponsored mortgage 
entities (GSEs) Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.29  At first, the investing 
community viewed PLSs skeptically,30 but, due primarily to the support of 
ratings agencies,31 they soon became widely successful.32  Eventually, Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac followed suit by lowering their own underwriting 
 
times.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/m/mortgage-backed-securities/index.html (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2014) (providing various links to additional pages and news articles discussing MBSs). 
 25.  See, e.g., Chris Wilson, What Is a Mortgage-Backed Security?: The Financial Instrument 
that Destroyed Bear Stearns, SLATE (Mar. 17, 2008), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_ 
and_politics/explainer/2008/03/what_is_a_mortgagebacked_security.html. 
 26.  See id. (“When the housing market is doing well and interest rates are low, investing in a 
mortgage-backed security is a fairly safe bet.”).   This was due in part to the high ratings assigned to 
them by credit rating agencies like Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s, and Fitch.  See infra note 38 
(expanding on the role of these agencies). 
 27.  An appropriate definition of “secondary mortgage market” is “the purchase and sale of 
MBS[s] either upon their issuance or between market participants.”  THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL., 
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES § 5:1 (2013). 
 28.  Tyler R. Morgan, The Refinancing Crisis in Commercial Real Estate: Dodd-Frank 
Threatens to Curtail CMBS Lending, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 361, 374 (2012); see also 
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 8, at xxiii (naming this as one of the failures leading to the 
financial crisis). 
 29.  See Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systematic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of 
Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1331 (2009) (“In contrast [with 
GSEs], private-label securitizers did not issue guarantees of credit risk.”). 
 30.  See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Editor’s Introduction: Responding to the Financial 
Crisis, 2010 SEC. L.R. § 1:2 (Donald C. Langevoort ed., 2010) (“While GSE-issued certificates were 
considered near-substitutes for U.S. Treasury securities, private label securities could not 
immediately instill confidence.”). 
 31.  See infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 32.  See McCoy, supra note 29, at 1330 (noting that PLS issuance rose from 24% of all MBSs in 
2003 to 55% in 2005, amounting to $1.19 trillion in loans). 
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standards.33  Banks responded by creating “collateralized mortgage [or debt] 
obligations,”34 in which the shares in an MBS were organized into different 
“tranches” according to the perceived risk.35 
MBSs fell into a dangerous cycle—repeatedly sold, resecuritized, 
retranched, and resold—theoretically spreading the risk of any individual 
homeowner defaulting so thin that it became practically non-existent.36  
Eventually, it became impossible for investors to identify the original 
mortgages backing their securities, or their quality, forcing them to rely on 
credit rating agencies to determine MBS value.37  For a variety of reasons, 
these ratings agencies had been inflating the ratings on even very risky 
classes of MBSs.38  These high ratings made the MBSs all the more 
 
 33.  Other factors also played a role in these lower standards: a major source was pressure from 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).  Richard E. Mendales, The Fall and 
Rise of Fannie and Freddie: Securitization After the Meltdown, 42 No.1 UCC L.J. art. 2 (2009) 
(“Despite warnings that [MBSs] based on subprime mortgages were significantly more prone to 
default than other such securities, [HUD], seeking to aid lower-income families in finding housing, 
pressed the GSEs first to buy lower-grade mortgages . . . and then securities backed by subprime 
mortgages . . . .”). 
  According to the FCIC, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac “relaxed their underwriting standards 
to purchase or guarantee riskier loans and related securities in order to meet stock market analysts’ 
and investors’ expectations for growth, to regain market share, and to ensure generous compensation 
for their executives and employees.”  FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 8, at xxvi. 
 34.  Mendales, supra note 33. 
 35.  FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 8, at 43. 
 36.  Eggert, supra note 22, at 1265. 
 37.  Id.  For example, the 3,500 loans targeted in S.B. County, supra Part II.B–C, were 
reportedly placed into 2,000 separate trusts, which then issued 17,000 separate trust certificates 
(backed by the loans), which were then sold to various investors.  Tad Friend, Letter from 
California, Home Economics: Can an Entrepreneur’s Audacious Plan Fix the Mortgage Mess?, 
NEW YORKER, Feb. 4, 2013, at 26, 27. 
 38.  See Eggert, supra note 22, at 1298–1303.  A large part of the problem stemmed from 
conflicts of interests—the ratings agencies were paid by the entities whose securities they rated.  
Mendales, supra note 33.  They gave investment-grade ratings to most of the GSEs’ MBSs, even 
when the mortgages backing the securities were of low quality.  Id. 
  The overrating of MBSs was another major contributor to the financial meltdown.  FIN. 
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 8, at xxv (“We conclude the failures of credit rating agencies 
were essential cogs in the wheel of financial destruction.”).  In what would be the first suit of its 
kind, the U.S. Justice Department plans to file civil charges against S&P’s Ratings Services, 
reportedly accusing it of “knowingly and with the intent to defraud, devised, participated in, and 
executed a scheme to defraud investors.”  Andrew Ross Sorkin & Mary Williams Walsh, U.S. 
Accuses S. & P. of Fraud in Suit on Loan Bundles, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2013), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/04/u-s-and-states-prepare-to-sue-s-p-over-mortgage-
ratings/?hp. 
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attractive to investors, further boosting their popularity and value.39 
The MBS system was not entirely unlike the classic pyramid scheme—it 
could not be sustained forever.40  When the housing bubble burst and 
homeowners around the nation defaulted on their loans, the unforeseen spike 
in foreclosure rates unveiled the flaws in the MBS system; the loss of the 
hundreds of billions of dollars invested in these questionable MBSs “shook 
markets as well as financial institutions that had significant exposures to 
those mortgages.”41 
As of the publication date of the FCIC Report,42 about four million 
families had lost their homes to foreclosure in the wake of the housing 
bubble burst, and another four and a half million were delinquent in or had 
defaulted on their mortgage payments.43  Cities and counties across the 
country remain in dire straits and still desperately seek a solution to the 
housing woes plaguing their communities.44 
B.  San Bernardino County’s Economic Situation 
The burst of the housing bubble rocked few spots in the country more 
severely than S.B. County.45  After decades of high unemployment and low 
incomes, the national housing boom of the 1990s and 2000s gave a much-
needed boost to S.B. County’s economy.46  House prices skyrocketed 
(homes could sometimes be “flipped” for profit over the course of a few 
days), peaking in about 2006, investors saturated the local housing market, 
 
 39.  Many financial institutions “loaded up on” these risky mortgages and MBSs in the years 
preceding the crisis.  FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 8, at xxv.  Lehman Brothers, for 
example, had amassed $111 billion in them (four times the institution’s total equity).  Id. at xx. 
 40.  For an explanation of a “pyramid scheme” in the context of financial investments, see What 
is a Pyramid Scheme?, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/ 
04/042104.asp  
 41.  FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 8, at xvi. 
 42.  See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
 43.  FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 8, at xv. 
 44.  This may explain the open-minded approach many municipalities have taken to the MRP 
proposal.  See infra notes 76–77 and accompanying text (describing positive responses of local 
politicians to the eminent domain scheme). 
 45.  Ben Hallman, San Bernardino Eminent Domain Fight Closely Watched by Other Struggling 
Communities, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 1, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/01/ 
eminent-domain-mortgages_n_1836710.html [hereinafter Hallman, Fight Closely Watched]. 
 46.  See id. 
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and jobs related to the industry flooded into the area.47 
When the housing bubble burst, the county’s skyrocketing housing-
market-based economy rapidly collapsed and the inflated value of homes 
plummeted.48  Even now, five years later, the county is struggling.  
Unemployment and foreclosures in S.B. County hit all-time highs: when the 
nationwide unemployment rate was 8.1% in August of 2012,49 the rate in the 
Riverside–San Bernardino–Ontario metropolitan area remained as high as 
12.3%.50  Meanwhile, the value of homes continued to sink; the median 
value of homes in the area, which peaked in 2006 at $382,000, is now 
hovering around $167,800.51  Many mortgages acquired or refinanced by 
homeowners around the 2006 peak were deeply “underwater”—where the 
owner’s equity in the house is less than the value still owed to the lender.52  
Reports released in June of 2012 put S.B. County in the top 5% of counties 
in the nation for percent of homes underwater.53  Reports published in late 
2012 suggest that 2013 will be a slightly brighter year for S.B. County.54  
Home prices are rising and foreclosure rates are declining throughout the 
country; in S.B. County itself, the number of defaulted loans dropped nearly 
22%—the lowest since 2007.55   
 
 47.  See id.  A recent New Yorker article discussing the MRP proposal dubbed California the 
“Barbary Coast of loan originators.”  Friend, supra note 37, at 26.  S.B. County in particular had 
become an investing hot spot because of its “cheap dirt.”  Id. at 29.  
 48.  Id. at 29.  (“After housing prices in the area tripled between 2000 and 2006, the subsequent 
plunge cut them by more than half . . . .  The ebb tide left only the shells of broken subdivisions . . . 
.”). 
 49.  Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (last visited Jan. 13, 2013).  
 50.  News Release—Wednesday, October 3, 2012, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Oct. 12, 
2012), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/metro_10032012.pdf.  
 51.  Hallman, Fight Closely Watched, supra note 45.  But see infra notes 54–55 and 
accompanying text. 
 52.  Underwater Mortgage, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/underwater-
mortgage.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2014). 
 53.  ZILLOW REAL ESTATE RESEARCH, NEGATIVE EQUITY REPORT (June 2012).  This research 
puts the percent of homes underwater at 52% for S.B. County, as compared to just 30.9% of homes 
for the U.S. overall.  Id. at 1. 
 54.  See THE CMTY. FOUND., SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY 2012 COMMUNITY INDICATORS 
REPORT 8, 27–28 (2012), available at http://www.sbcounty.gov/uploads/cao/feature/ 
content/2012_cir_sb.pdf; see also infra notes 188–90 and accompanying text. 
 55.  See Joe Nelson, Homeownership Protection Program JPA Cancels October Meeting, SAN 
BERNARDINO COUNTY SUN (Oct. 21, 2012), http://www.sbsun.com/ci_21832939/homeownership-
protection-program-jpa-cancels-october-meeting. 
[Vol. 41: 633, 2014] Treading Water 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
642 
C.  The Eminent Domain Proposal 
Enter Mortgage Resolution Partners (MRP), the private, San Francisco-
based venture fund behind the eminent domain proposal that drew 
consideration from S.B. County.56  After pitching the program to S.B. 
County CEO Greg Devereaux in the fall of the 2011,57 the county Board of 
Directors publicly discussed it in a June 2012 meeting.58  MRP’s eminent 
domain proposal, dubbed the CARES (Community Action to Restore Equity 
and Stability) Program: 
• Assists communities in using their power of eminent 
domain to acquire underwater mortgage loans and 
offering to refinance them into sustainable loans with 
lower principal balances. 
• Prevents the costs to communities and neighbors of 
future defaults and foreclosures. 
• Is voluntary; does not affect homeowners who choose 
not to refinance. 
• Is privately funded, requires no taxes or funding from 
communities or homeowners. 
• Targets loans trapped in private securitization trusts; 
avoids mortgages whose owners have broad powers to 
reduce principal, such as banks and government 
agencies. 
• Creates incentives for homeowners to maintain their 
good credit to qualify for the program.  Many other 
mortgage programs require borrowers to default before 
 
 56.  MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, http://mortgageresolution.com (last visited Jan. 14, 
2014).  In its own words, MRP is a “Community Advisory firm working to stabilize local housing 
markets and economies by keeping as many homeowners with underwater mortgages in their homes 
as possible.”  Id. 
 57.  Friend, supra note 37, at 29.  An early proponent of the plan, Devereaux was ultimately the 
one to announce its abandonment.  See infra notes 97–101. 
 58.  Andrew Edwards, Mortgage Resolution Partners Executive Defends Eminent Domain 
Proposal, SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SUN (July 25, 2012, 9:00 PM), 
http://www.sbsun.com/ci_21168357/mortgage-resolution-partners-executive-defends-eminent-
domain-proposal.  In addition to Devereaux, California Lieutenant Governor Gavin Newsom was an 
early supporter of MRP’s plan.  Friend, supra note 37, at 29.  The meeting’s minutes are available on 
the county’s website: http://sanbernardino.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=13&clip_id= 
2444 (last visited Jan. 14, 2014).  
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considering their needs. 
• Is designed and controlled by each local government, 
which chooses the loans and methods for resolving 
them to meet local needs.59 
In short, MRP plans to raise money from private investors60 and then 
front that money to a municipality for the purpose of compensating 
mortgage holders for the condemned loans.61  MRP would receive a $4,500 
flat fee per loan in addition to return on their investment.62  According to 
MRP, the firm itself does not earn any profit share.63  The county would then 
use its power of eminent domain to condemn specific mortgages.64  Once the 
municipality acquires the loans, homeowners could refinance these 
mortgages at a lower principal, reducing mortgage payments.65  The plan 
would have applied to approximately 10% of S.B. County loans held in 
private security trusts.66 
On June 19, 2012, the S.B. County Board of Supervisors took its first 
steps toward implementing the MRP proposal.67  Along with the cities of 
 
 59.  MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, supra note 56. 
 60.  Matthew Goldstein & Jennifer Ablan, Exclusive: Investors Tout Controversial 
“Condemnation” for Housing Fix, REUTERS (June 8, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/08/us-mortgages-condemnation-housing-
idUSBRE85719Z20120608 [hereinafter Goldstein & Ablan, Investors Tout Controversial 
“Condemnation”].  MRP is apparently working with investment banks Evercore Partners, Inc. and 
Westwood Capital to find the institutional investors needed to finance the plan.  Id. 
 61.  See infra notes 230–42 (discussing compensation requirements on the state level), 263–66 
(discussing federal compensation requirements). 
 62.  Ben Hallman, San Bernardino Eminent Domain Proposal Arousing Concern from Mortgage 
Industry, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/16/san-
bernardino-eminent-domain_n_1791773.html [hereinafter Hallman, Proposal Arousing Concern]. 
 63.  Fact or Fiction, MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, http://mortgageresolution.com/fact-or-
fiction (last visited Jan. 14, 2014).  However, MRP claims the loans would likely generate a 20% 
annual return for its investors.  Goldstein & Ablan, Angelides to Lead Distressed Mortgage Firm, 
supra note 18. 
 64.  Hallman, Proposal Arousing Concern, supra note 62. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id.  However, homeowners would not have to refinance their loans, and could choose to 
continue to make payments on the existing loans.  FAQs: What Rights and Obligations Will 
Homeowners Have When the Local Government Acquires Their Loans?  What Happens to 
Homeowners Who Do Not Refinance?, MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, 
http://mortgageresolution.com/faqs (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).  
 67.  HOMEOWNERSHIP PROTECTION PROGRAM JOINT POWERS AUTHORITY, FIRST AMENDED 
AND RESTATED JOINT EXERCISE OF POWERS AGREEMENT § 4 (June 19, 2012) [hereinafter JPA 
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Ontario and Fontana, the county created the Homeownership Protection 
Program Joint Powers Authority (JPA).68  The JPA was authorized to use the 
joint powers of all three government entities (S.B. County, Ontario, and 
Fontana),69 including the use of eminent domain.70  The JPA Agreement 
granted it all the powers necessary to implement the MRP proposal.  Among 
other things, it authorized the JPA to “acquire by voluntary purchase, gift, 
eminent domain, or otherwise home loans,”71 to “own, maintain, and manage 
home loans . . . including, but not limited to, modification, restructuring, 
hypothecating, assigning, pledging, securitizing, conveying, and 
reconveying,”72 to “receive contributions and donations of property, funds, 
services, and other forms of assistance from any source,”73 and to “assign, 
delegate, or contract with a Party or third party to perform any of the rights 
and duties of the Board.”74 
D.  The Backlash 
When word that S.B. County was considering the MRP proposal went 
public, the backlash was fast and ferocious.  Politicians on the local, state, 
and federal levels voiced strong opinions on the plan; industry 
representatives vehemently opposed it; and commentators from various 
sectors added their two cents to the nationwide debate.75 
 
AGREEMENT], available at http://www.homeownershipjpa.org/Portals/18/Documents/Agreement. 
pdf. 
 68.  Id.  The City of Hesperia had also considered joining the JPA, but voted on June 5, 2012 not 
to participate.  Goldstein & Ablan, Investors Tout Controversial “Condemnation”, supra note 60.  
 69.  See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6502 (West 2008) (“If authorized by their [legislature] . . . two or 
more public agencies by agreement may jointly exercise any power common to the contracting 
parties . . . .”). 
 70.  JPA AGREEMENT, supra note 67, § 4(d). 
 71.  Id.  This authorizes the condemnation aspect of the proposal and would allow the county to 
subsequently transfer the mortgages to a servicer, presumably MRP.  See supra note 64 and 
accompanying text. 
 72.  JPA AGREEMENT, supra note 67, § 4(e).  This section would give the JPA the power to 
restructure the loans at reduced principals under the MRP proposal.   
 73.  Id. at § 4(i).  This power would allow MRP to contribute the funds that the county would 
need to condemn the selected loans.   
 74.  Id. at § 4(l).  Possibly the most controversial section, this would allow the JPA to transfer 
any of its powers directly to MRP. 
 75.  The Wall Street Journal published a few memorable critiques, calling the plan, among other 
things, “grand theft mortgage” and “an eminently bad idea.”  See Grand Theft Mortgage: American 
Enterprise Institute Fellow Ed Pinto on California Cities that Want to Seize and Refinance 
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Leaders of economically troubled municipalities generally supported the 
plan, or at least expressed cautious optimism.  Sacramento Vice Mayor 
Angelique Ashby, for example, was vocal in her support of the MRP 
proposal, and her desire to bring the plan to Sacramento.76  The proposal also 
piqued the interest of other California communities, like Elk Grove—Gary 
Davis, an Elk Grove city councilman, reportedly spoke with MRP and was 
“intrigued” by the plan.77  At present, at least one community has actually 
voted to enact the proposal: Richmond, California.78  However, at least one 
high-profile local politician has expressly rejected the plan: Chicago Mayor 
Rahm Emanuel.79  After considering MRP’s proposal, which could affect as 
many as 20,000 Chicago homeowners, Emanuel decided that the MRP plan 
was not “the right way to address the problem,” telling reporters: “I don’t 
think it’s the power of the city . . . to deal with the housing issue.  We have a 
national issue.  I think we have to address the issue.  I just don’t think that’s 
the right instrument.”80 
 
Mortgages Under the Auspices of Eminent Domain, WALL ST. J. (July 5, 2012), 
http://live.wsj.com/video/opinion-grand-theft-mortgage/8CC3E75C-2DA4-4550-B3C0-97D78CA74 
902.html#!8CC3E75C-2DA4-4550-B3C0-97D78CA74902; An Eminently Bad Idea, WALL ST. J. 
(July 12, 2012), at A16. 
 76.  Peter S. Goodman, Eminent Domain as Underwater Mortgages Fix: Why Some Cities Are 
Considering Unorthodox Measure, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 1, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/01/eminent-domain-mortgages_n_1917391.html.  In an 
interview with the Sacramento Bee, Ashby explained that her community “is one of the worst-hit 
communities in the country,” giving vivid examples of struggling homeowners in her neighborhood.  
Hudson Sangree, Sacramento Area Officials Explore Using Eminent Domain to Aid Underwater 
Homeowners, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 11, 2012), at 1A, available at 
http://www.sacbee.com/2012/08/11/4715792/sacramento-area-officials-explore.html. 
 77.  Sangree, supra note 76 (“I’m intrigued by the notion . . . .  We’re engaged in a conversation 
with [MRP] to better understand it.”). 
 78.  Jim Christie, California City Backs Plan to Seize Negative Equity Mortgages, REUTERS 
(Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/11/us-richmond-eminentdomain-
idUSBRE98A0FN20130911; Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Against Richmond, California Mortgage 
Plan, REUTERS (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/16/us-usa-mortgages-
ruling-idUSBRE98F12M20130916 [hereinafter Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Against Richmond].   
 79.  Mary Ellen Podmolik & John Byrne, Emanuel: Eminent Domain Not ‘The Right Instrument’ 




 80.  Id.  Emanuel’s willingness to defer to federal authority on the issue might be attributable to 
his former roles in Washington as a U.S. Congressman from Illinois and President Obama’s Chief of 
Staff.  Jeff Zeleny & Peter Baker, Rahm Emanuel Accepts Chief of Staff Post, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/us/politics/07elect.html. 
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At the state level, California Lieutenant Governor Gavin Newsom—
while not expressly endorsing the plan—encourages “bold action” in solving 
the crisis, and vocally defended S.B. County’s consideration of the 
proposal.81  Newsom went as far as complaining to the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s antitrust division when he believed the mortgage and finance 
industries, as well as the federal government, had threatened the 
communities considering the plan.82 
The federal government more vehemently opposed the MRP proposal.  
Some politicians, like U.S. Representative Patrick McHenry, a Republican 
from North Carolina, have challenged MRP’s financial motivation and the 
potential for corruption.83  McHenry complained in a letter to the Secretary 
of Housing and Urban Development, Shaun Donovan, about the risks of 
“cronyism or conflicts” associated with MRP,84 and asked for information on 
the preventative steps being taken.85  The controversy erupted after MRP, in 
soliciting funding, touted its ability to use “legal and political leverage” in 
negotiating its deals with municipalities.86  Angelides eventually left MRP, 
 
 81.  Andrew Edwards, California’s Lieutenant Governor Steps into Mortgage Debate, SAN 
BERNARDINO COUNTY SUN (July 26, 2012), http://www.sbsun.com/ci_21177556/californias-
lieutenant-governor-steps-into-mortgage-debate?IADID=Search-www.sbsun.com-www.sbsun.com.  
In a phone interview, Newsom told the San Bernardino County Sun that: “The economy in our state 
is not going to rebound until we address the number one thing holding us back, and that’s these 
homes that are underwater.”  Id. 
 82.  Newsom’s letter read, in part: “I am most disturbed by the threats leveled by the mortgage 
industry and some in the federal government who have coercively urged local governments to reject 
consideration of any proposal that would exercise the powers constitutionally granted local 
governments to use eminent domain.”  Lazo, supra note 13; see also infra notes 88–90 (discussing 
federal legislation against the MRP proposal). 
 83.  Matthew Goldstein & Jennifer Ablan, Financial Crisis Chair Angelides Quits Mortgage 
Firm, REUTERS (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/13/us-mortgages-angelides-
idUSTRE81C20A20120213 [hereinafter Goldstein & Ablan, Angelides Quits Mortgage Firm].  
Representative McHenry is the chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform 
subcommittee on the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).  Id.  Among other functions (like 
overseeing government bailouts), TARP manages the Making Home Affordable (MHA) program— 
which it created to provide mortgage relief to homeowners and prevent avoidable foreclosures—and 
its cornerstone program, the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP).   Housing, U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-
Programs/housing/pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2014).  HAMP “reduces [homeowners’] 
mortgage payments to affordable levels for qualifying borrowers” and is the primary federal 
competitor to the MRP proposal.  Id. 
 84.  Goldstein & Ablan, Phil Angelides Gives Up His “Secret Formula”, supra note 18.  
 85.  Goldstein & Ablan, Angelides Quits Mortgage Firm, supra note 83. 
 86.  Goldstein, Phil Angelides Gives Up His “Secret Formula”, supra note 18 (noting that 
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but Representative McHenry insisted that he still wanted Donovan to 
respond to his questions.87  In a more extreme reaction to the plan, U.S. 
Representative John Campbell, a Republican from California, introduced a 
bill in the House of Representatives intended to discourage municipalities 
from taking action like that featured in MRP’s proposal.88  The goal of the 
bill, creatively named the Defending American Taxpayers from Abusive 
Government Takings Act, was: 
To prohibit Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from purchasing, 
the FHA from insuring, and the Department of Veterans 
Affairs from guaranteeing, making, or insuring, a mortgage 
that is secured by a residence or residential structure 
located in a county in which the State has used the power of 
eminent domain to take a residential mortgage.89 
The bill currently rests with the House Financial Services Committee, its 
fate to be determined at some later date.90 
Another instrumentality of the federal government has also expressed 
disapproval of the plan: the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).  The 
FHFA, which rejected a principal reduction strategy similar to MRP’s for 
GSE loans,91 published in the Federal Register that: 
 
Angelides “quietly stepped down from the firm” about two weeks after the story of his involvement 
was published on Reuters). 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  H.R. 6397, 112th Cong. (2012), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/ 
112/hr6397 (last visited Jan. 16, 2014).  The bill, cosponsored by eleven other House Republicans, 
was introduced on September 13, 2012 and referred to the House Committee on Financial Services.  
Id.; see also Jann Swanson, Congress Gets Bill Prohibiting Eminent Domain Mortgage Seizures, 
MORTGAGE NEWS DAILY (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/09132012_ 
eminent_domain_loan_mods.asp.  The bill was re-introduced as H.R. 2733 on July 18, 2013 and has 
an estimated 2% chance of being enacted.  H.R. 2733, 112th Cong. (2013), available at 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr2733 (last visited Jan. 16, 2014). 
 89.  H.R. 6397.  This bill was one of the actions challenged by Gavin Newsom as being 
retaliatory.  See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
 90.  H.R. 2733. 
 91.  Letter from Edward J. DeMarco, Acting Director, FHFA, to the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs (July 31, 2012) [hereinafter Letter from Edward J. DeMarco], available 
at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/24110/PF_LettertoCong73112.pdf.  The letter read, in part: 
 After much study, I have concluded that [the GSEs’] adoption of [this 
principal reduction plan] would not make a meaningful improvement in 
reducing foreclosures in a cost effective way for taxpayers.  
     . . . .  
     . . . [The] longer-term view by investors that the mortgage contract is less 
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     FHFA has significant concerns about the use of eminent 
domain to revise existing financial contracts and the 
alteration of the value of [GSE] or Bank securities 
holdings. . . . 
     FHFA has determined that action may be necessary on 
its part as conservator for the [GSEs] and as regulator for 
the Banks to avoid a risk to safe and sound operations and 
to avoid taxpayer expense. 
     Among questions raised regarding the proposed use of 
eminent domain are the constitutionality of such use; the 
application of federal and state consumer protection laws; 
the effects on holders of existing securities; the impact on 
millions of negotiated and performing mortgage contracts; 
the role of courts in administering or overseeing such a 
program, including available judicial resources; fees and 
costs attendant to such programs; and, in particular, critical 
issues surrounding the valuation by local governments of 
complex contractual arrangements that are traded in 
national and international markets.92 
Not surprisingly, the strongest opposition comes from those with the 
most to lose from the MRP plan—the industries currently owning, servicing, 
and profiting from the considered mortgages.  Most notable is the Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA).  In its official 
position statement on the topic, SIFMA “strongly object[ed] to any proposed 
use of eminent domain to take mortgage loans out of securitized pools.”93  In 
the same statement, SIFMA also explained that “[e]minent domain stands to 
hurt the very borrowers it seeks to help; there are better alternatives.”94  
 
secure than ever before . . . . could lead to higher mortgage rates, a 
constriction in mortgage credit lending or both, outcomes that would be 
inconsistent with FHFA’s mandate to promote stability and liquidity in 
mortgage markets and access to mortgage credit. 
Id. at 1, 4. 
 92.  Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg. 47652 (Aug. 9, 
2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-08-09/pdf/2012-19566.pdf. 
 93.  Eminent Domain Resource Center, SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, 
http://www.sifma.org/issues/capital-markets/securitization/eminent-domain/overview/ (last visited 
Jan. 17, 2014). 
 94. Id. 
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Along with twenty-five other trade organizations,95 SIFMA submitted a joint 
response to the FHFA’s request for comments on the proposed eminent 
domain solution, citing as objectionable the impact of such a plan on 
mortgage markets and mortgage investors; the valuation and profit 
motivation that underlies the plan; and the various legal issues discussed in 
this Comment.96 
E.  The Demise of the Proposal (for S.B. County) 
On January 24, 2013 the JPA board met to discuss, among other things, 
whether it would actually pursue the MRP eminent domain proposal.97  After 
months of debate, the JPA board voted unanimously not to consider the 
MRP proposal further.98  Greg Devereaux, chairman of the JPA and county 
CEO—the same Greg Devereaux that instigated the MRP dialog months 
earlier99—announced that the JPA would be “taking [the proposal] off the 
table” due to a lack of public support.100  David Wert, spokesman for S.B. 
 
 95.  Letter from SIFMA et al. to Alfred Pollard, General Counsel, FHFA (Sept. 7, 2012), 
available at http://www.sifma.org/workarea/downloadasset.aspx?id=8589940214 [hereinafter Letter 
from SIFMA].  These include trade organizations like the American Bankers Association, the 
California Bankers Association, the Consumer Bankers Association, the Association of Mortgage 
Investors, and the American Insurance Association.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Alejandro Lazo, San Bernardino County Abandons Eminent Domain Mortgage Plan, L.A. 
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-mo-eminent-domain-
20130124,0,4577228.story [hereinafter Lazo, County Abandons Eminent Domain Mortgage Plan]; 
see also Meeting Agenda for January 24, 2013, Homeownership Prot. Program Joint Powers Auth. 
(Jan. 24, 2013), available at http://sanbernardino.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?publish_id=531; 
Press Release, Homeownership Prot. Program JPA, JPA Declines to Consider Eminent Domain 
Proposals, (Jan. 24, 2013), available at http://www.sbcounty.gov/uploads/CAO/ 
pressreleases/content/JPA_RFQ_PR_1-24-13.pdf [hereinafter JPA Press Release]. 
 98.  Lazo, County Abandons Eminent Domain Mortgage Plan, supra note 97. 
 99.  See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 100.  Lazo, County Abandons Eminent Domain Mortgage Plan, supra note 97.  “Devereaux also 
echoed criticisms by the mortgage industry and Wall Street groups, who have argued such a plan 
would spark lawsuits, higher interest rates and a tightened market for borrowers.”  Alejandro Lazo, 
San Bernardino County Abandons Mortgage Plan, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/25/business/la-fi-eminent-domain-20130125 [hereinafter Lazo, 
County Abandons Mortgage Plan]; see also Kathleen Pender, San Bernadino County Won’t Use 
Eminent Domain to Seize Mortgages, S.F. CHRON. BLOG (Jan. 24, 2013), 
http://blog.sfgate.com/pender/2013/01/24/san-bernadino-county-wont-use-eminent-domain-to-seize-
mortgages/.  “Many experts warned that eminent domain would destabilize an already weak local 
housing market, . . . Devereaux . . . said in a press release.”  Id. 
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County, reported that “[s]ome residents said, ‘We don’t like eminent domain 
in any form.’”101 
In addition to this negative feedback from residents, the proposal had a 
“chilling effect” on the county’s relationship with other parties.102  In the 
county’s statement, Wert went on to say that: 
The presence of a potential eminent domain proposal was 
causing problems with us developing relationships with 
other people who actually have solutions.  The people we 
should be relying on to help solve this problem . . . are the 
bankers, the mortgage industry, the investment community.  
Just the presence of eminent domain was causing that 
relationship not to develop.  It had a chilling effect.103 
Rather than continuing to explore MRP’s plan, the JPA voted to explore 
additional proposed solutions to the mortgage problems plaguing the 
county.104  Exactly what steps the JPA will take to further these programs, 
 
 101.  Pender, supra note 100 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 102.  Pender, supra note 100 (acknowledging the existence of such “chilling effect”).  Here, 
“parties” refers to those like SIFMA and the federal government.  See supra notes 94–96 and 
accompanying text. 
 103.  Pender, supra note 100.  In an interview following the plan’s rejection SIFMA’s director 
reported: 
We are encouraged to hear that the county has decided it will not pursue use 
of eminent domain to restructure mortgages . . . .  As SIFMA has said, the 
unprecedented, potential use of eminent domain would cause severe damage 
to struggling housing markets and is likely unconstitutional on its face.  We 
are pleased that the county has recognized these risks and decided to move in 
other directions. 
Lazo, County Abandons Eminent Domain Mortgage Plan, supra note 97 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 104.  Lazo, County Abandons Eminent Domain Mortgage Plan, supra note 97.  At the same 
January 24, 2013 meeting, the board approved an agreement to work “with finance and real estate 
industry groups on publicizing existing government and bank programs available to homeowners.”  
Imran Ghori, San Bernardino County: Eminent Domain Mortgage Solution Rejected, PRESS 
ENTERPRISE (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.pe.com/local-news/politics/imran-ghori-
headlines/20130124-san-bernardino-county-eminent-domain-solution-rejected.ece [hereinafter 
Ghori, Eminent Domain Rejected]; see also JPA Press Release, supra note 97.  The county’s current 
programs include “www.saveyourhomesbcounty.org,” a county website designed to “make [local] 
homeowners aware of programs and local events aimed at addressing foreclosures and negative 
equity.”  Id.  The JPA plans to draft a new version of its written request for proposals once the 
eminent domain restriction has been added, along with a new “risk assessment” requirement for 
submitted plans.  Id. 
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however, is unclear.105 
The JPA appears to have definitively retired the plan, but the MRP 
proposal lives on.  MRP Chairman Steven Gluckstern reports that his firm 
remains in talks with over thirty other communities.106  In fact, one of the 
JPA municipalities, the City of Fontana, has indicated that it might move 
forward independently; Fontana’s mayor, Acquanetta Warren, asserted that 
it would be irresponsible for the city not to consider all options to aid 
homeowners.107  The most promising municipality today, however, is 
Richmond.108  Nevertheless, For S.B. County, the proposal appears to be 
dead in the water. 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Origin and Scope of Eminent Domain Power 
In order to understand the limitations and range of the county’s power of 
eminent domain, one must understand the source of this particular brand of 
police power.109  Where does the county’s authority to take private property 
come from?  More importantly, what is the extent of that power currently 
exercisable by the JPA? 
Eminent domain—the “power of a governmental entity to take privately 
owned property and convert it to public use”110—is considered an inherent 
attribute of sovereignty.111  It is “necessary to the very existence of the 
 
 105.  The power assigned to the JPA by its member entities was fairly specific to the MRP 
proposal.  See infra notes 126–29 and accompanying text (discussing the express powers of the 
JPA).  That being the case, the JPA’s ability to implement broader plans may be ineffective. 
 106.  Ghori, Eminent Domain Rejected, supra note 104 (“A handful of [these communities] could 
begin acquiring mortgages within the next month, [Gluckstern said in January 2013].”). 
 107.  Id.  Mayor Warren reportedly complained that: “This is falling on complete deaf ears on the 
state and federal level . . . .  They have abandoned the guy who plays by the rules, the guy who pays 
his mortgage every month.  Nobody wants to talk about this guy.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 108.  See supra note 78 and accompanying text.  Again, because the events in Richmond occurred 
after this Comment was initially drafted, it will be discussed only briefly. 
 109.  See 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 3 (2012) (“Eminent domain is a right founded on the 
law of necessity which is inherent in sovereignty and essential to the existence of government.”).   
 110.  Id. at § 2. 
 111.  Cnty. of San Mateo v. Coburn, 63 P. 78, 79 (Cal. 1900).  See also 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent 
Domain § 3 (2012). 
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government.”112  The takings clauses of the federal and state constitutions, 
therefore, do not grant the power to condemn property; they “merely place 
limitations upon its exercise.”113  The only external limitations on 
California’s power as a sovereign entity are those enumerated in the United 
States Constitution.114  Internally, the power to exercise eminent domain is 
limited further by the California constitution115 and any restrictions 
voluntarily enacted by the state legislature.116 
On the other hand, municipal corporations (like counties and cities) do 
not have an inherent power of eminent domain.117  Counties and cities “can 
exercise [eminent domain], if at all, only when expressly authorized by 
law.”118  In California, both the state constitution and the Government Code 
provide this express authorization.119  Article XI, section 7 of California’s 
constitution provides that “[a] county or city may make and enforce within 
its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not 
in conflict with general laws.”120  Statutory law—contained within the 
California Government Code—acknowledging the assignment of 
condemnation power complements the state constitution’s broad grant of 
authority.121 
This broad authority trickles down in its entirety to the county, but S.B. 
County is additionally restricted by a self-imposed limitation incorporated 
 
 112.  NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.14[2] [hereinafter NICHOLS]. 
 113.  People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works v. Chevalier, 340 P.2d 598, 601 (Cal. 1959) (in bank); 
Gober v. Stubbs, 682 So. 2d 430, 433 (Ala. 1996). 
 114.  See infra Part V (analyzing whether federal constitutional restrictions will block the S.B. 
County proposal). 
 115.  “Private property may be taken or damaged for a public use and only when just 
compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the 
owner.”  CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(a) (emphasis added). 
 116.  See infra Part IV (discussing legality of the mortgage takings within state law). 
 117.  City of S.F. v. Ross, 279 P.2d 529, 531 (Cal. 1955) (in bank). 
 118.  Id.  
 119.  See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (state constitution’s eminent domain clause); CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 25350.5 (West 2012) (state’s statutory eminent domain scheme). 
 120.  CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7. 
 121.  GOV’T § 25350.5 (“The board of supervisors of any county may acquire by eminent domain 
any property necessary to carry out any of the powers or functions of the county.”).  A careful 
reading of the California Government Code reveals that “property,” as it is used here, “includes real 
and personal property.”  Id. § 180.  Because the county is limited to the powers expressly granted to 
it, the fact that the California Code assigning the power to condemn “property” does not expressly 
include intangible property in its definition might present a legitimate, yet likely surmountable, 
challenge.  See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 180, 25350.5. 
[Vol. 41: 633, 2014] Treading Water 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
653 
into the county’s charter via a voter-approved amendment in 2006.122  It 
mandates that the county “may not exercise the power of eminent domain to 
acquire property from any private Owner [of fee interest], without such 
Owner’s consent, when the purpose of the acquisition is to convey the 
property so acquired to any private party.”123  This local restriction, of 
course, would not apply to other municipalities considering the MRP 
proposal, but it is still relevant in a broader analysis—local governments 
across the nation have commonly adopted this sort of charter amendment or 
ordinance.124 
Finally, the JPA itself is limited to exercising powers (which are 
legitimately held by the county and the other parties to the Joint Powers 
Authority agreement125) that are expressly granted to it in the agreement 
itself.126  These include the powers to “acquire [mortgages] by voluntary 
purchase, gift, eminent domain, or otherwise”;127 to “own, maintain, and 
manage” these mortgages through various means;128 and to “assign, delegate, 
or contract with . . . third part[ies] to perform any of the rights and duties of 
the [JPA].”129 
The question of whether the mortgage takings proposed in S.B. County 
would have withstood judicial scrutiny depends on whether the plan falls 
within the bounds of these limitations.  Because the county’s power of 
eminent domain flows from the state’s authority, the county is subject to all 
laws constraining the state.130  Any taking that violates local, state, or federal 
limitations on eminent domain will fully invalidate the MRP proposal.131 
 
 122.  SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, CAL. CHARTER Foreword (2006), available at 
http://www.co.sanmateo.ca.us/bos.dir/CharterReviewCommittee/SanBernardinoCharter.pdf. 
 123.  Id. art. VI, § 5; see also discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 124.  These laws were enacted in the wake of Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), a 
decision that expanded the scope of eminent domain.  See infra note 159. 
 125.  See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 126.  See JPA AGREEMENT, supra note 67, § 4. 
127 Id. §4(d) 
 128.  Id. § 4(e).  Specifically, these means include, but are not limited to, “modification, 
restructuring, hypothecating, assigning, pledging, securitizing, conveying, and reconveying.”  Id. 
 129.  Id. § 4(l); see also supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text (explaining the correlation 
between the JPA’s powers and those required by the MRP proposal). 
 130.  See supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text. 
 131.  See Robert Hockett, It Takes a Village: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings and 
Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation, and Local 
Economic Recovery, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 163 (2012) [hereinafter Hockett, It Takes a 
Village].  
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B.  Can Mortgages Be Taken? 
 
While there is no record of California—or any other state—using 
eminent domain to condemn a mortgage (as opposed to extinguishing a 
mortgage as a result of a real property taking),132 case law strongly suggests 
that states can take mortgages just like any other kind of property.133  As far 
back as 1848, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to draw a distinction 
between the application of eminent domain to physical property and its 
application to intangible property.134  The California Supreme Court has 
mirrored that sentiment, holding that “neither the federal nor the state 
Constitution distinguishes between property which is real or personal, 
tangible or intangible.”135 
In City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, the California Supreme Court 
considered whether the City of Oakland had acted constitutionally in its 
unprecedented use of eminent domain in attempting to condemn the Oakland 
Raiders football franchise.136  In that case, the court acknowledged that, 
unless expressly restricted, “the right of eminent domain encompasses 
property of every kind and character,”137 including “patent rights, franchises, 
charters or any other form of contract.”138  The California Supreme Court 
viewed the Oakland Raiders franchise as a collection of personal property, 
real property, intellectual property, and contractual rights—all of which can, 
at least in theory, be taken by the state.139  Conceptually, there is no reason 
 
 132.  Although he believes the firm’s plan will withstand legal challenges, even MRP’s chairman 
acknowledges that using eminent domain for mortgages is untested.  Goldstein & Ablan, Investors 
Tout Controversial “Condemnation,” supra note 60. 
 133.  See, e.g., City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (Oakland Raiders I), 646 P.2d 835, 838–40 
(Cal. 1982) (in bank).  But cf. San Diego Metro. Transit Dev. Bd. v. Handlery Hotel, Inc., 86 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 473, 484 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the possibility to lease property in the future is not 
an interest, but contractual options to renew are).  
 134.  W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 534 (1848) (concluding that such a distinction 
“has no foundation in reason”). 
 135.  Oakland Raiders I, 646 P.2d at 840. 
 136.  Id. at 835. 
 137.  Id. at 839 (quoting 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 87 (2012)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 138.  Id. (quoting NICHOLS, supra note 112, § 2.01[2]) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 139.  See generally id.  In Oakland Raiders I, the respondents use the phrase “network of 
intangible contractual rights.”  Id. at 837.  This case was eventually remanded and the city was found 
to have acted unconstitutionally.  City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (Oakland Raiders II), 220 Cal. 
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that mortgages—nothing more than contractual debt obligations secured by 
an interest in real property140—should not be considered property for the 
purposes of eminent domain proceedings. 
C.  Where is a Mortgage Located? 
Traditionally, a government entity can exercise the power of eminent 
domain over any property physically located within its boundaries.141  When 
eminent domain is extended to intangible property, it becomes less clear 
where the property is “located” and whether the government entity can 
lawfully condemn that property.142  In Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of 
Baltimore, the Seventh Circuit encountered an interesting twist on the facts 
in Oakland Raiders that allowed it to address the issue of intangible property 
jurisdiction.143  The controversy began with failed lease negotiations between 
the owners and operators of the Baltimore Colts’ (now the Indianapolis 
Colts) stadium and the team.144  When the Colts began negotiating with a 
new venue, located in Indianapolis, the Maryland Senate attempted to keep 
the team in Maryland by initiating eminent domain proceedings against the 
team.145  Upon learning of this, the team “fled Baltimore under the cloak of 
darkness,” literally loading the team’s equipment into moving vans and 
driving to Indianapolis.146 
This case raised jurisdiction issues that the Supreme Court had not 
previously addressed.147  The Court has, however, addressed the issue of 
 
Rptr. 153, 154, 158 (Ct. App. 1985); see also discussion infra Part V.C. 
 140.  54A AM. JUR. 2D Mortgages § 1 (2012).  In title theory jurisdictions like California, a 
mortgage can be defined as “in essence a defeasible deed, requiring the grantee to reconvey the 
property held as security to the grantor upon satisfaction of the underlying debt or fulfillment of 
established conditions.”  Id. 
 141.  NICHOLS, supra note 112, § 2.07 (“[Eminent domain is] inherently limited to subjects within 
the state’s jurisdiction.”);  see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 181 (West 2012) (reserving to the 
government the “original and ultimate right to all property within the limits of the State” (emphasis 
added)).  
 142.  See supra Part III.B. 
 143.  Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of Balt., 741 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 144.  See id. at 955. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  See Ellen Z. Mufson, Note, Jurisdictional Limitations on Intangible Property in Eminent 
Domain: Focus on the Indianapolis Colts, 60 IND. L.J. 389, 392 (1985) (“[T]he main difficulty lies 
in determining just where the franchise was located at the time of the suit.”). 
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intangible property location in other contexts—for example, the sovereign 
power of taxation.148  Traditionally, “[f]or the purposes of taxation, a debt149 
has its situs at the residence of the creditor, and may there be taxed.”150  A 
debt is not the property of the debtor “in any sense”;151 it is the property of 
the creditor, and is taxed as such.152  The creditors holding ownership rights 
to the mortgages, in this case, could be located anywhere in the world. 
Although neither California nor U.S. Supreme Court precedent squarely 
addresses the jurisdiction issues faced here, treatment under federal tax law 
is telling.  The fact that federal tax law treats mortgages as intangible 
property located in the creditor’s domiciliary state indicates that the power 
of eminent domain (a sovereign power like taxation) will follow suit.153  
Accordingly, if the mortgages themselves are determined to exist beyond the 
boundaries of the state, the MRP plan will likely fail on those grounds 
alone.154 
IV.  ANALYSIS ON THE STATE LEVEL 
A.  Violation of Local Law? 
The first hurdles that the S.B. County proposal would face are those 
 
 148.  Id. at 395–96.  See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes of Vt., 445 U.S. 425, 436–37 
(1980) (applying a minimum contacts test in taxing a foreign entity). 
 149.  A “debt” is analogous to a mortgage here.  See supra note 140 and accompanying text.  In 
title theory states like California, the government would theoretically be condemning the title and the 
contractual obligation.  See supra note 140.  Even if the “title” is conveyed, it cannot be taken except 
as part of the entire mortgage obligation.  First, taking the title of the homes was expressly excluded 
from the JPA’s powers.  JPA AGREEMENT, supra note 67, Recital C.  Additionally, although taking 
the title from the mortgagor in title theory states seems simpler, doing this would result in the 
government holding exclusive title to the house—this would require the creation of an entirely new 
mortgage with the homeowner and infinitely complicate the plan, far beyond the scope of this 
Comment. 
 150.  Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U.S. 491, 491 (1879) (holding that a state may tax debt of its 
residents upon a citizen of another state, secured by a deed of trust or mortgage upon real estate 
situated in that other state).  This doctrine is known as mobilia sequuntur personam—“movables 
follow the . . . person.”  See Mufson, supra note 147, at 391 & n.11 (quoting BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 905 (5th ed. 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 151.  Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 213 (1930). 
 152.  Id.  (“[D]ebts can have no locality separate from the parties to whom they are due.”). 
 153.  See Mufson, supra note 147, at 410–11 (“[T]he rule of mobilia sequuntur personam for 
intangible property provides a workable standard for eminent domain.”). 
 154.  NICHOLS, supra note 112, § 2.07. 
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created by its own local laws.155  The JPA’s use of eminent domain is 
indirectly considered action by the state legislative body,156 but the county 
must still follow its own municipal law and charter.157  In this case, S.B. 
County’s charter does in fact contain a provision expressly limiting its use of 
eminent domain.158  Specifically, it prohibits taking property for the purpose 
of “convey[ing] the property so acquired to any private party.”159 
The question then becomes whether the purpose of the S.B. proposal is 
indeed to convey to a private party, or whether a subsequent conveyance to 
MRP would solely be a consequential benefit for the greater purpose of 
reducing home loan principals, etc.  The statute’s use of the word “purpose” 
leaves room for ambiguity, but it seems likely that California courts will 
hold that the S.B. County proposal would violate this amendment of the 
county’s charter.  Conveying to third parties is an express power assigned to 
the Homeownership Protection Program JPA,160 and the MRP proposal 
would involve the transfer of mortgages to third parties (as opposed to the 
county holding and servicing the loans itself), if only for the purposes of 
coordinating servicing and resolution of acquired mortgages. 
Regardless of whether the true “purpose” of the proposed taking is 
debatable, California law dictates that “[s]tatutory language defining 
eminent domain powers is strictly construed and any reasonable doubt 
concerning the existence of the power is resolved against the entity.”161  
There is surely at least a “reasonable doubt” that this sort of taking is 
precluded by the county’s charter and, using this standard, the MRP proposal 
 
 155.  See supra note 124 and accompanying text (explaining the likely relevance of this local 
analysis to future manifestations of the MRP proposal). 
 156.  For example, the JPA is exercising the county’s eminent domain power as assigned to it in 
the Joint Exercise of Powers Agreement.  JPA AGREEMENT, supra note 67, § 4(d). 
 157.  The principles that apply to construing statutes also apply to the interpretation of county 
charter provisions and ordinances.  See Arntz v. Superior Court, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 561, 568 (Ct. 
App. 2010).   
 158.  SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, CAL. CHARTER, art. VI, § 5 (2006), available at 
http://www.co.sanmateo.ca.us/bos.dir/CharterReviewCommittee/SanBernardinoCharter.pdf. 
 159.  Id.  This is just one of countless similar laws passed around the country in the aftermath of 
the private-party-to-private-party economic development takings decision of Kelo v. City of New 
London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  See generally Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the 
Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009). 
 160.  JPA AGREEMENT § 4(e) (granting power to engage in “conveying” and “reconveying”). 
 161.  Burbank–Glendale–Pasadena Airport Auth. v. Hensler, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 729, 733 (Ct. App. 
2000) (quoting Kenneth Mebane Ranches v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562, 566 (Ct. App. 
1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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could have been blocked in S.B. County on these grounds alone.162 
Additionally, looking to the Board of Supervisors’ intent in supporting 
the measure creating this amendment provides insight into its intended 
scope.163  The Board itself urged voters to approve the amendment, stating in 
its officially filed argument that “[t]he power of eminent domain must be 
limited and must only be used in cases of a demonstrated public necessity 
such as highway or flood control channel.”164  The Board argued that this 
justified a charter amendment, as opposed to a mere ordinance, in order to 
ensure that “this protection of property rights is . . . not subject to change by 
any future Boards of Supervisors.”165 
Despite the expressed intent that the amendment not be changed, a 
county’s charter is not immutable.166  If S.B. County truly wishes to push 
through these proposed mortgage takings, there is a procedure for repealing 
this provision of its charter and defaulting its power of eminent domain to 
the maximum level assigned to it by the state.167  The California Constitution 
establishes that: “[A] county or city may adopt a charter by majority vote of 
its electors voting on the question. . . .  A charter may be amended, revised, 
or repealed in the same manner.”168 
 
 162.  Additionally, a taking for the sole purpose of transferring property to a private party, without 
a public good being served, is always invalid.  See infra Part IV.C.1.  If the county charter’s 
additional provision (added on November 7, 2006) is not read to prohibit these mortgage takings, 
then the charter is essentially “toothless”—it provides no additional limitation and would not change 
the scope of the county’s power.  SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, CAL. CHARTER Foreword (2006), 
available at 
http://www.co.sanmateo.ca.us/bos.dir/CharterReviewCommittee/SanBernardinoCharter.pdf.  It 
seems unlikely that the county would expressly add this limitation (by amendment) if it did not mean 
to change the scope of local eminent domain power.  See infra note 163 and accompanying text 
(demonstrating the legislative intent here). 
 163.  San Bernardino County Board of Supervisors & the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n, 
Measure “O”, Argument in Favor (on file with author).  No arguments were filed in opposition to the 
measure.  Id. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id.  The amendment was eventually approved by a 37% margin in the November 7, 2006 
general election.  Nov. 7, 2006 General Election Results, SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY ELECTIONS 
OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR OF VOTERS (Dec. 1, 2006), http://cms.sbcounty.gov/Portals/9/Elections/ 
Past_Elections/2006-11-06_ElectionResults.pdf. 
 166.  S.B. County’s charter was originally approved by the State Legislature and filed with the 
Secretary of State on April 7, 1913 and has been amended thirty-six times since then.  SAN 
BERNARDINO COUNTY, CAL. CHARTER Foreword (2006), available at 
http://www.co.sanmateo.ca.us/bos.dir/CharterReviewCommittee/SanBernardinoCharter.pdf. 
 167.  See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(a). 
 168.  Id. 
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So, S.B. County could have overcome this obstacle, but not without 
substantial effort.  The issue would have had to go to the people and receive 
a majority vote in a municipal election.169  In a practical sense, this challenge 
at the local level might have been one of the hardest to overcome.170  If the 
S.B. County charter had to be amended, the sheer logistics required might 
have discouraged the county from moving forward with the mortgage 
takings proposal, or at least delayed it substantially.171 
B.  Violation of California Statutory Law? 
Courts will not generally consider broader constitutional issues if the 
condemnation action is unlawful according to applicable statutes.172  In this 
case, California has enacted an extensive set of requirements, limitations, 
and procedures for the use of eminent domain173—eminent domain can only 
be exercised in accordance with those rules and procedures.174  The 
California Civil Procedure Code establishes three specific requirements for 
any use of eminent domain: (1) “public interest and necessity require the 
project”; (2) “[t]he project is planned or located in the manner that will be 
most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury”; 
and (3) “[t]he property sought to be acquired is necessary for the project.”175 
1.  Public Interest and Necessity Must Require the Project 
California statutory law demands that public interest and necessity 
require the MRP project.176  Although this is a fact-sensitive inquiry, and one 
 
 169.  Id.  See also, CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9102 (West 2013) (“[N]othing in this article shall be 
construed to allow a board of supervisors to enact, amend, or otherwise revise a county charter 
without submitting the proposal to the voters.”). 
 170.  The California Elections Code provides extensive regulation of county elections.  ELEC. 
§9100–90. 
 171.  See supra notes 166–70 and accompanying text. 
 172.  See Gatto v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 556 (Ct. App. 2002) (“If this statutory 
violation is established, it would be unnecessary for us to address the constitutional question, as 
constitutional issues ordinarily will be resolved on appeal only if ‘absolutely necessary’ and not if 
the case can be decided on any other ground.” (quoting Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, 195 P.2d 1, 9 
(Cal. 1948))). 
 173.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1230.010–1274.17 (West 2007). 
 174.  Id. § 1230.020. 
 175.  Id. § 1240.030. 
 176.  Id. § 1240.030(a).  “Public interest and necessity” is read to include “all aspects of the public 
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in which the decision of the legislative body will be given great deference,177 
this necessity is still subject to judicial review.178  For the purposes of this 
requirement, the details of specific mortgages are irrelevant—the court will 
review the eminent domain plan in its entirety for the requisite public 
interest and necessity.179 
The stated purpose of this project is to “assist in preserving home 
ownership and occupancy for homeowners with negative equity,” to “avoid 
the negative impacts of underwater loans and further foreclosures,” and to 
“enhance the economic vitality and the health of . . . communities.”180  
Proponents asserted that the proposal was needed to address the housing 
crisis;181 however, data provided by the FHFA suggests that it may not be.182  
Little independent research or hard evidence was provided suggesting that 
the FHFA’s conclusions on principal reduction are invalid, or that S.B. 
County’s particular situation warranted a different approach,183 but the 
 
good including but not limited to social, economic, environmental, and esthetic considerations.”  Id. 
(Legis. Comm. Comments). 
 177.  See, e.g., Shell Cal. Pipeline Co. v. Compton, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 753, 758–59 (Ct. App. 1995) 
(“Public use and necessity are to be construed liberally in favor of the condemnor.”). 
 178.  CIV. § 1230.050. 
 179.  See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 180.  JPA AGREEMENT, supra note 67, Recital C. 
 181.  See, e.g., Yuki Noguchi, County Considers Eminent Domain as Foreclosure Fix, NPR NEWS 
(July 13, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/13/156683302/county-considers-eminent-domain-as-
foreclosure-fix (explaining that, in Gluckstern’s view, what is “needed to undo [the mortgage crisis] 
. . . is a powerful legal tool [like MRP’s eminent domain proposal] that can force mortgage investors 
to sell those loans and cut through all the red tape”). 
 182.  Letter from Edward J. DeMarco, supra note 91 (refusing to implement a principal 
reduction/forgiveness plan—the same strategy that MRP would use on S.B. County mortgages—for 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgages).  In his letter to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, DeMarco explained that principal reduction “would not make a meaningful 
improvement in reducing foreclosures in a cost effective way for taxpayers.”  Id.; see supra Part 
II.D. 
 183.  See generally Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra note 131 (discussing the FHFA’s 
conclusions).   MRP’s primary proponent has been Cornell School of Law Professor Robert Hockett.  
Hockett wrote a fifty-six-page paper outlining and analyzing the viability of proposals like MRP’s.  
Id.  He has also blogged in support of the MRP proposal.  Robert Hockett, A Solution for 
Underwater Mortgages: Eminent Domain, REUTERS (June 19, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-
debate/2012/06/19/a-solution-for-underwater-mortgages-eminent-domain/. 
  However, Professor Hockett’s paper is not entirely independent.  In a conversation with 
blogger Felix Salmon, MRP chairman Steven Gluckstern revealed that his company had paid 
Hockett an “honorarium” to write the paper.  Felix Salmon, Why Using Eminent Domain for Liens Is 
a Bad Idea, REUTERS (June 21, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2012/06/21/why-using-
eminent-domain-for-liens-is-a-bad-idea/.  Reporting on his conversation with Gluckstern, Salmon 
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county, MRP, or their supporters may have produced more concrete 
supporting evidence, had project progressed further.184 
This factor is especially unclear here because the exact details of MRP’s 
plan, as it would be enacted in S.B. County, had not yet been determined.185  
In fact, MRP had retooled the plan at least once (presumably) in response to 
opponents’ criticism and to conform more closely to this element of 
California’s statutory requirements.186  While the final plan encompassed all 
mortgages, it originally would condemn only performing, current 
mortgages—as opposed to those in default or with delinquent payments—
whose homeowners had good credit.187 
Adding still more uncertainty to this element is the fact that the S.B. 
County and California economies and housing markets are, it seems, 
improving.188  More importantly, the average value of a home in San 
Bernardino is actually on the rise.189  The home sales price for the county 
rose 24.4% between April 2012 and April 2013.190  This rise in home values 
 
skeptically noted that “MRP did not see the paper before Hockett published it, but seeing as how 
Hockett wrote ‘The Way Forward’ [another paper on this subject] with Dan Alpert, one of the key 
principals behind MRP’s scheme, there was surely no doubt about what his conclusions would be.”  
Id.  Hockett does disclose in a footnote that “the author is disinterested in what he is here 
recommending, but may subsequently undertake more legal, financial or expository work in 
connection with the proposals offered and advocated herein.”  Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra 
note 131, at 121 n.*. 
 184.  If they did not, a court could have blocked eminent domain actions brought pursuant to the 
plan for failure to provide “substantial evidence,” amounting to “gross abuse of discretion.”  Santa 
Cruz Cnty. Redev. Agency v. Izant, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366, 371 (Ct. App. 1995) (“[G]ross abuse of 
discretion may be shown by a lack of substantial evidence supporting the resolution of necessity.”). 
 185.  MRP notes that its plan is adaptable to local conditions: “Each local government has the 
power to determine whether to acquire loans, and if so which loans.”  Fact or Fiction, supra note 63. 
 186.  See Imran Ghori, San Bernardino County: Mortgage Aid Expanded, PRESS ENTERPRISE 
(Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.pe.com/local-news/politics/imran-ghori-headlines/20120906-san-
bernardino-county-mortgage-aid-expanded.ece [hereinafter Ghori, Mortgage Aid Expanded]. 
 187.  Id.  The original policy was made “because of the increased risk and difficulty of refinancing 
such loans.”  Id. 
 188.  See Nelson, supra note 5554.  According to a DataQuick Information Systems report 
released in October 2012, California foreclosure rates actually dropped to the lowest level since 
2007 (a 31% drop in number of foreclosures statewide).  Id.  In S.B. County specifically, there had 
been a nearly 22% drop at the time of the DataQuick report.  Id. 
 189.  CAL. ASS’N OF REALTORS, SAN BERNARDINO 2012 ECONOMIC PROFILE, available at 
http://www.realtor-info.com/reports/sbeconomicreport.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2014). 
 190.  Id.  The California Association of Realtors, citing a DataQuick Information Systems Report, 
reports that the median countywide home value rose from $156,000 to $194,000 between April 2012 
and April 2013.  Id. 
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and fall in foreclosure rates weakened the argument that necessity and public 
interest supported or required adoption of the eminent domain project.191 
2.  Project Must Be Arranged in Manner Most Compatible with the 
Greatest Public  Good and the Least Private Injury 
Second, is the project planned in a manner that will be most compatible 
with the greatest public good and the least private injury?  Again, this is a 
fact-sensitive inquiry that allows for a great degree of legislative 
deference.192  In order to determine the answer to this question, the purpose 
of this proposal must be examined and it must be determined whether the 
use of eminent domain is “most compatible” with achieving that purpose.193 
If the purported purpose of the plan is to keep homeowners in their 
homes, it is not difficult to see how the originally proposed plan might have 
been attacked as ill-tailored to those purposes: homeowners still making 
their monthly mortgage payments are more valuable to the holders of those 
loans than homeowners in default (so the proposal would maximize private 
harm), and restructuring the loans of homeowners that can afford to pay 
does not target the group most likely to lose their homes to foreclosure (so 
the proposal would minimize public benefit).194  Wisely, after the initial 
wave of controversy following the plan’s announcement, MRP decided to 
change this and include delinquent homeowners and those in default in the 
program.195  The expansion of the program would increase the number of 
eligible homeowners from 3,500 to 15,000, according to MRP executive 
chairman Steven Gluckstern.196 
Including more loans in the program necessarily increases the amount of 
private loss to loan holders, but it also increases the public benefit to 
homeowners.  Accordingly, including the homeowners most likely to need 
assistance will make the ratio of private loss to public gain more favorable, 
increasing its odds of passing statutory muster.  Whether the statutory 
requirement would have actually been satisfied, however, is far from clear 
 
 191.  See supra note 180 and accompanying text (reiterating the stated purposes of the 
Homeownership Protection Program). 
 192.  See supra note 177–78 and accompanying text. 
 193.  See supra notes 175, 180 and accompanying text. 
 194.  See supra note 186–87 and accompanying text. 
 195.  See Ghori, Mortgage Aid Expanded, supra note 186. 
 196.  Id. 
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and will remain unanswered.197 
3.  Particular Property Must Be Necessary to Proposal 
Finally, the specific property sought (in this case, any particular 
mortgages on underwater property) must be necessary for the project.198  The 
traditional (and lenient) standard used for necessity here is whether the 
property is “reasonably suitable and useful for the improvement.”199  When a 
taking entity condemns property, it must first approve a “resolution of 
necessity.”200  Once approved, the element of necessity is conclusively 
established, with a few enumerated exceptions: when (a) the property is 
outside the entity’s boundaries;201 (b) the resolution is affected by gross 
abuse of discretion;202 or (c) the resolution is adopted through bribery.203 
Once the municipality determines that the use of eminent domain is 
necessary and approves a resolution of necessity, it will take fairly 
 
 197.  Extrapolating this logic, the proposal would be even more likely to pass muster on this 
element if it only included delinquent mortgages or those in default.  These are the homeowners that 
are most likely to default and the loans that are least valuable to the current loan holders.  On the 
other hand, this introduces the risk of homeowners “strategically defaulting,” or walking away from 
their mortgages as part of a financial strategy, not an actual inability to pay.  Strategic Default, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/strategic-default.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 
2014). 
 198.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.030(c) (West 2007).  This question, as it relates to the S.B. 
County takings, presents a bit of a paradox.  MRP would not have restructured all underwater 
mortgages; the proposal allowed homeowners to choose whether to actually participate in the 
restructuring program.  FAQs, supra note 66.  (“Homeowners will have the same rights and the same 
obligations that they have now . . . .  If they do not refinance then they simply continue to pay on 
their existing loan.”).  This means that some of the condemned mortgages could have remained 
exactly as they were.  Id.  If the county approved a resolution determining that restructuring these 
loans was necessary, justifying the use of eminent domain, the county should require that the taken 
loans are, in fact, restructured.  If the decision to restructure a loan is completely optional at the 
choice of the homeowner, condemnation of that loan could not have been necessary to the eminent 
domain proposal as a whole.  See CIV. § 1240.030(c). 
 199.  City of Hawthorne v. Peebles, 333 P.2d 442, 445 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (quoting NICHOLS, 
supra note 112, § 4.11[4]) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 200.  CIV. § 1245.220 (“A public entity may not commence an eminent domain proceeding until 
its governing body has adopted a resolution of necessity . . . .”). 
 201.  Id. § 1245.250(c). 
 202.  Id. § 1245.255(b). 
 203.  Id. § 1245.270(a)(1).  Although bribery would justify overturning a resolution of necessity, 
id., there is no evidence of such impropriety in this case, and this Comment will operate under the 
assumption that there is no improper or illegal activity involved. 
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compelling evidence to rebut that presumption.204  However, rebuttal is 
possible—for example, if the situs of the mortgage is determined to exist 
outside the county’s boundaries, the resolution could be defeated.205  
Additionally, “gross abuse of discretion” might be established if the 
resolution is shown to be “arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in 
evidentiary support,”206 or that the taking entity had already committed to the 
plan prior to approving the resolution.207  Abuses of discretion that might 
justify judicial rejection of resolutions of necessity include “a fatally vague 
statement of purpose.”208 
If a municipality passes a resolution of necessity pursuant to the MRP 
proposal, it might have difficulty avoiding such excessive vagueness.209  It 
will be difficult to provide definitive answers to precisely how many 
mortgages will be taken, which loans will be taken, or whether the 
municipality will actually restructure each loan.210  California law requires 
that eminent domain proposals be sufficiently defined: “[T]hat which is left 
unlimited, and is to be determined only by such future action as the [c]ity 
 
 204.  See infra notes 246–61 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of judicial scrutiny of 
legislative determinations). 
 205.  See supra notes 141–54 and accompanying text.  See also infra Part IV.B.4 (discussing 
territorial limits). 
 206.  Redev. Agency of Chula Vista v. Rados Bros., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234, 240 (Ct. App. 2001); 
Huntington Park Redev. Agency v. Duncan, 190 Cal. Rptr. 744, 748 (Ct. App. 1983).  See also Santa 
Cruz Cnty. Redev. Agency v. Izant, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366, 371 (Ct. App. 1995) (“[G]ross abuse of 
discretion may be shown by a lack of substantial evidence supporting the resolution of necessity.”). 
 207.  See Redev. Agency of Huntington Park v. Norm’s Slauson, 219 Cal. Rptr. 365 (Ct. App. 
1985). 
 208.  City of Stockton v. Marina Towers LLC, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 909, 924 (Ct. App. 2009).  In 
Marina Towers, the California Court of Appeal rejected the city’s resolution of necessity as a gross 
abuse of discretion in part because it relied on vague conclusions, such as the declaration that the 
condemned property was “within a ‘catalyst site’ for [the area’s] revitalization.”  Id. at 914.  The city 
planned to transfer the condemned property to private developers for the construction of an 
apartment complex, id., but “simply trot[ted] out a laundry list of statutes setting forth a plethora of 
possible purposes for condemning property.”  Id. at 922.  Despite having the power to review 
resolutions for “gross abuse of discretion,” supra note 202 and accompanying text, state courts must 
not “retrace the legislative body’s analytic route when the statutory scheme requires much greater 
deference to the condemning body’s determination of necessity.”  City of Saratoga v. Hinz, 9 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 791, 807 (Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Izant, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 209.  This would make the taking invalid under section 1240.030(c).  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 
1240.030(c) (West 2007).  
 210.  See supra note 198. 
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may hereafter decide upon, is not defined.”211  If the MRP plan continues to 
allow the borrower to choose whether to restructure the loans, there is a 
strong chance that it could fail on these grounds: taking mortgages on the 
theory that they might be restructured later (dependent entirely upon the will 
of the individual homeowners), is likely to fall short of the required level of 
specificity.212 
4.  Territorial Limitations 
The California Code of Civil Procedure also specifies that, for local 
entities, the condemned property must be within the entities’ territorial 
limits.213  The entity exercising eminent domain in this case is the 
Homeownership Protection JPA.214  As a joint entity, the territorial limits in 
question here would have been those of S.B. County and the cities of 
Ontario and Fontana.215 
If the situs of a mortgage is not, in fact, located exclusively at the situs 
of the real property securing it,216 then another problem might arise.217  If the 
property (the mortgage) is legally located at the domicile of the creditor, the 
JPA could not have condemned loans unless the current holders of the 
mortgages themselves were domiciled within its physical boundaries.218   
C.  Violation of State Constitution? 
For the most part, California courts have interpreted the limitations of 
 
 211.  Marina Towers, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 923 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 
448 (1930)). 
 212.  See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 213.  CIV. § 1240.050. 
 214.  See supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text. 
 215.  See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 216.  See supra Part IV.B.3. 
 217.  That is, if the mortgage is “located” at the situs of the lender—as Part III.C argues it is—the 
JPA may be limited not only to loans within California, but only to those within S.B. County.  See 
supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text. 
 218.  Part III.C presents this view.  If this argument is accepted, even mortgages (or parts of 
mortgages) purchased by private trusts and banks located within California would be beyond the 
reach of the JPA.  This could drastically reduce the number of eligible loans, further damaging the 
argument for a general public good and placing additional strain on the other statutory takings 
requirements.  See supra Parts IV.B.1–3. 
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the state’s takings clause congruently with those of its federal counterpart.219  
Specifically, the only limitations provided by the U.S. Constitution are the 
requirements that the taking serves a public use and that just compensation is 
paid.220  California’s Constitution, however, is slightly more restrictive.  It 
includes a provision requiring compensation for damaged property in 
addition to condemned property; furthermore, “fair compensation” must be 
determined by a jury, not the condemning entity or a judge.221 
1.  Public Use Requirement 
For purposes of the California state constitution, a public use is “a use 
which concerns the whole community as distinguished from a particular 
individual or a particular number of individuals; public usefulness, utility or 
advantage; or what is productive of general benefit; a use by or for the 
government, the general public or some portion of it.”222  MRP states that the 
public purpose of its program is “to protect neighbors and the broader 
community from defaults, foreclosures, and the losses that they cause.”223  
On its face, this purpose seems to satisfy the definition of public use 
required by California courts: the terms “neighbors” and “broader 
community” clearly suggest a purpose that concerns the whole community 
and conveys a general benefit.224  Further, the JPA Authority Agreement of 
the Homeownership Protection Program states the JPA was created to, 
among other things, “enhance the economic vitality and the health of . . . 
communities [of homeowners with negative equity].”225  This, too, sounds 
like a purpose that satisfies the public use standard applied in California. 
 
 219.  Small Prop. Owners of S.F. v. City of S.F., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 121, 125 (Ct. App. 2006).  
Based on this standard, state courts will likely apply the same standards discussed infra Part V.A. 
regarding the U.S. Takings Clause. 
 220.  Mt. San Jacinto Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Superior Court, 151 P.3d 1166 (Cal. 2007). 
 221.  CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(a). 
 222.  City of L.A. v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 506 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting 
Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 895 P.2d 900, 908 (Cal. 1995) (in bank)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  This definition of “public use” originates from the Cyclopedia of Law and 
Procedure.  15 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 581 (William Mack ed., 1905), available at 
http://archive.org/details/cu31924061134379.  However, it is still commonly cited, at least in 
California cases.  See, e.g., Customer Co., 895 P.2d 900 (Cal. 1995) (in bank); Miller v. City of Palo 
Alto, 280 P. 108, 109 (Cal. 1929). 
 223.  Fact or Fiction, supra note 63. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  JPA AGREEMENT, supra note 67, Recital C. 
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However, public use is still a question of law to be determined by a 
court.226  The California Constitution limits eminent domain to use of 
property for public purposes, and if a judge decides that the plan, despite 
legislative intent to the contrary, does not in fact do so, the proposal will be 
shot down.227 
2.  Just Compensation 
The second crucial element of any eminent domain action is the 
requirement that just compensation be paid.228  But what is “just 
compensation”?  It is difficult to discuss whether the plan will, in fact, 
satisfy this constitutional requirement because the JPA has not offered any 
hard figures yet, and every condemnation proceeding will be unique.229  
However, because this element is central to the analysis, this section will 
discuss what amount of payment would theoretically have been needed to 
pass constitutional muster. 
In its Civil Procedure Code, the California legislature has codified 
earlier court decisions defining just compensation in an eminent domain 
action.230  Specifically, the state must pay: 
[T]he highest price on the date of valuation that would be 
agreed to by a seller, being willing to sell but under no 
particular or urgent necessity for so doing, nor obliged to 
sell, and a buyer, being ready, willing, and able to buy but 
 
 226.  See infra notes 243–61 and accompanying text. 
 227.  See City of S.F. v. Ross, 279 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1955) (finding use of eminent domain to be, in 
fact, for private use, despite legislative declaration of public use); see generally, Timothy Sandefur, 
A Natural Rights Perspective on Eminent Domain in California: A Rationale for Meaningful 
Judicial Scrutiny of “Public Use”, 32 SW. U. L. REV. 569 (2003). 
 228.  See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
 229.  The JPA, exercising its assigned legislative power, is free to set forth the prices it is willing 
to offer mortgage holders—“[i]ts choices, however, are not necessarily the measure of the ‘just’ 
compensation constitutionally due.”  Redev. Agency of Burbank v. Gilmore, 700 P.2d 794, 803 (Cal. 
1985).  MRP acknowledges that good faith negotiations will be required.  Comment Letter from 
Mortgage Resolution Partners to Alfred Pollard, General Counsel, FHFA (Sept. 7, 2012), available 
at http://mortgageresolutionpartners.com/sites/default/files/attachments/fhfa_comment_letter_9.7.12 
.pdf [hereinafter Comment Letter from Mortgage Resolution Partners to FHFA] (last visited Jan. 20, 
2014). 
 230.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1263.320(a) (West 2007) (codifying Sacramento So. R.R. v. 
Heilbron, 104 P. 979 (Cal. 1909) as explained in the relevant Legislative Committee Comments). 
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under no particular necessity for so doing, each dealing 
with the other with full knowledge of all the uses and 
purposes for which the property is reasonably adaptable 
and available.231 
Other state court decisions have further defined the scope and purpose 
of the fair compensation requirement.  In City of Carlsbad v. Rudvalis, the 
Court of Appeal specified that the purpose of just compensation for 
condemned property is “to put the owner in as good a position pecuniarily as 
he would have occupied if his property had not been taken.”232  In Joffe v. 
City of Huntington Park, the court added that both federal and state 
constitutional requirements look to “‘not what the taker has gained, but what 
the owner has lost.’”233 
To determine what just compensation should be, a hypothetical 
illustration might be helpful.  Take an S.B. County homeowner who 
purchased a house at the peak of the housing bubble, in 2006, at $382,000.234  
At the time of the MRP proposal in S.B. County, the house would be worth 
$167,800.235  Assume also that the homeowner had not refinanced the 
mortgage and had a current outstanding principal of $275,000.236  How much 
should the JPA and MRP have paid the holder of this mortgage to condemn 
it? 
It seems logical that the minimum value that at which the lender would 
agree to sell the loan is equal to the value of the property securing the loan 
(i.e., the home).  If the homeowner fully stops making payments, the 
 
 231.  Id.  But see supra note 229 (describing the limited nature of legislative declarations of fair 
compensation). 
 232.  135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 194, 202 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing City of San Diego v. Rancho Penasquitos 
P’ship, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108, 118–19 (Ct. App. 2003)); see also San Diego Metro. Transit Dev. Bd. 
v. Cushman, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 121, 124 (Ct. App. 1997). 
 233.  134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868, 874 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Tilem v. City of L.A., 191 Cal. Rptr. 
229, 233 (Ct. App. 1983)). 
 234.  See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 235.  See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 236.  Suppose our hypothetical borrower made a 20% down payment on the property ($76,400) 
and took out a thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage (“FRM”) at 6.28% (the national monthly average for 
January of 2006). See HSH’s National Monthly Mortgage Statistics: 2006, HSH.COM, 
http://www.hsh.com/natmo2006.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2014)).  Assuming he continued making 
his scheduled payments, he would currently owe $274,838 on the remaining $305,600.  See 
Mortgage Amortization Calculator, HSH.COM, http://www.hsh.com/calc-amort.html (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2014). 
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mortgage holder will at least retain the property (worth $167,800 in this 
example).  However, the mortgage holder will forgo the expenses involved 
in the foreclosure process.237  Some estimates place this at almost $80,000,238 
which would reduce the low-end estimate to $87,800.  In the high-end figure 
scenario—the scenario in which the homeowner continues making regular 
payments until the loan is paid off—the mortgage holder would, after fully 
paying off principal and interest, have received $679,535.239  The lender 
would not have received the full value of the loan, however, until December 
of 2035, which means that the high-end figure must be discounted to present 
value—$305,977.240 
“Just compensation” will likely fall somewhere between those two 
values, after considering the odds of the homeowner defaulting.241  
Explaining the appropriate benchmark to a jury,242 however, could prove to 
be difficult, making the ultimate determination of just compensation 
unpredictable. 
 
 237.  They must be paid the flat compensation before the mortgage is actually taken, and 
theoretically, there will be no foreclosure.  See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(a). 
 238.  Glenn Setzer, Foreclosures Cost Lenders, Homeowners, the Community Big Bucks, 
MORTGAGE NEWS DAILY (Jun. 2, 2008), http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/622008_ 
Foreclosure_Costs.asp. 
 239.  These figures were calculated using the mortgage amortization calculator accessible at 
Mortgage Amortization Calculator, supra note 236. 
 240.  In other words, the right to receive $679,535 over the course of twenty-three years would be 
worth only $305,977 at the time of the MRP proposal.  See Present Value Calculator, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/calculator/pvcal.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (using 
3.53% interest rate—the average rate on a thirty-year FRM on Feb. 7, 2013—compounded yearly 
over twenty-three years).  See Weekly Primary Mortgage Market Survey, FREDDIE MAC, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2014) (used to determine the discount rate). 
  An even more extensive calculation would probably include other deductions from this 
present value figure, like any other demonstrable expenses forgone by giving up the mortgage 
(servicing expenses, etc.). 
 241.  San Bernardino County Real Estate Trends & Market Info, REALTYTRAC, 
http://www.realtytrac.com/trendcenter/ca/san+bernardino-county-trend.html (last updated Dec. 
2013). 
 242.  A jury determination of just compensation is expressly required by the California 
Constitution.  See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(a). 
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V.  ANALYSIS ON THE FEDERAL LEVEL 
A.  Violation of Federal Takings Clause? 
1.  Public Use Requirement 
Just as on the state level,243 federal eminent domain law does not 
interpret the term “public use” to literally mean that the condemned property 
must be made physically available for public access.  On the federal level, 
courts will generally uphold the use of eminent domain so long as the 
condemnation relates to a “conceivable public purpose.”244  The taking does 
not need to benefit the whole community, or even necessarily a considerable 
portion of it.245 
While a “purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the 
public use requirement,”246 the fact that the property is taken from one 
private party and transferred immediately to a different private party does 
not necessarily “condemn that taking as having only a private purpose.”247  
The legislative determination that eminent domain can be used for a 
particular project is “deemed to be a declaration . . . that such use . . . is a 
public use.”248  This declaration, however, is not completely immune from 
judicial review.249 
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the U.S. Supreme Court found 
that a condemnation action in which the state of Hawaii took private 
property for the benefit of another private party did not violate the public use 
 
 243.  See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 244.  See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Bos. & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 422 (1992) (quoting 
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984)); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32–34 
(1954). 
 245.  Rindge Co. v. L.A. Cnty., 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923).  However, the fact that the condemned 
land in Rindge Co. was to be used as a highway was important.  Id. at 706.  In deciding the case, the 
court stressed: “That a taking of property for a highway is a taking for public use has been 
universally recognized,” and that the state’s code specifically named highways to be a public use.  
Id.  The determinations in this case seem highly distinguishable upon the facts; condemning a 
mortgage has not been universally recognized as a public use. 
 246.  Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245. 
 247.  Id. at 243–44. 
 248.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.010 (West 2007). 
 249.  See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
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limitation on a state’s power of eminent domain.250  While the Court 
acknowledged that its role in reviewing the use of eminent domain should be 
an “extremely narrow” one, it addressed two primary issues regarding the 
public use requirement.251  First, the Court held that the condemnation act 
fell within the traditional scope of a “classic exercise of a State’s police 
powers” to regulate the perceived social and economic evils of a land 
oligopoly traceable to Hawaii’s original monarchical and feudal system of 
land ownership.252  Second, the state act’s method of redistributing the 
parcels of land was considered rational.253 
The Court set a very low standard for scrutinizing public purpose in 
Midkiff, one that the MRP proposal could very well satisfy.  In order to have 
met the federal standard of public purpose, it must only be determined that 
the county could have rationally believed that this proposal would promote 
its objective: reducing foreclosures on underwater mortgages.254  This is a 
question of fact, and one that will probably be analyzed using the same 
standards as those on the state level, if not with slightly more deference to 
the county’s determination.255 
Midkiff does demonstrate, however, that the Supreme Court does have 
the power to review state eminent domain proceedings for “rationality.”256  
Despite the Court’s expressed reluctance, it did in fact look at the details of 
the plan and factually determined whether, in its opinion, the act was 
rational.257  So, even if it is determined that state and federal takings clauses 
use the same standard for public use, there is still room for separate U.S. 
Supreme Court review under the federal version of the clause. 
 
 250.  Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241. 
 251.  Id. at 240 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)). 
 252.  Id. at 241–42. 
 253.  Id. at 242.  Specifically, the constitutionality test is satisfied if the state legislature 
“rationally could have believed that the [Act] would promote its objective.”  Id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671–72 (1981)). 
 254.  See id. 
 255.  See supra Part IV.C.1 (discussing judicial limitations on public use determinations). 
 256.  This suit was filed in federal court, where the Court of Appeals rejected the legislature’s 
determination that the act served a public use.  Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 234–35.  The decision was 
reversed not because the appellate court acted beyond its power to review, but because it applied the 
wrong level of scrutiny in its review.  Id. at 243 (rejecting the appellate court’s decision that the 
taking in question warranted “more rigorous judicial scrutiny”). 
 257.  Id. at 240 (“There is, of course, a role for courts to play in reviewing a legislature’s 
judgment of what constitutes a public use, even when the eminent domain power is equated with the 
police power.”).   
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If MRP’s proposal survived Supreme Court scrutiny on the public use 
factor, the Court’s holding would depend greatly on the factual information 
available to the county at the time it passes the resolution of necessity.258  
Other than the paper written by Professor Robert Hockett,259 the majority of 
then-available information suggests that the negative consequences outweigh 
the positive.260  This certainly cuts against finding that the plan satisfies the 
rationality standard; however, Midkiff sets the level of legislative deference 
so high that the federal Takings Clause will provide little scrutiny of public 
use beyond  California’s statutory and constitutional requirements.261 
2.  Just Compensation Requirement 
Like the California Constitution’s takings clause,262 the U.S. Takings 
Clause also contains a just compensation requirement.263  The Fifth 
Amendment prohibits the taking of “private property . . . for public use, 
without just compensation.”264  The just compensation clause here is less 
restrictive than its California counterpart in that (1) it lacks the jury 
requirement of the California Constitution, and (2) it does not require the 
compensation be paid before the taking.265  Because it is less restrictive, the 
just compensation requirement of the U.S. Takings Clause will likely 
provide little constitutional protection above and beyond that provided by 
the California Constitution—if it satisfies the state requirement, the federal 
clause is not likely to obstruct the MRP proposal.266 
 
 258.  See supra Part IV.B.3. 
 259.  See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 260.  See, e.g., Letter from Edward J. DeMarco, supra note 91. 
 261.  See supra Part IV.B (discussing the relevant statutory limitations); supra Part IV.C 
(discussing the relevant state constitutional limitations). 
 262.  See supra Part IV.C. 
 263.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 264.  Id.  
 265.  California’s takings clause expressly requires that just compensation be paid to the owner (or 
into court for the owner) before taking the property.  CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(a).  Federal courts 
have held, on the other hand, that an eminent domain action does not violate the Fifth Amendment 
merely because it occurs before payment of just compensation.  See, e.g., Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 
57, 62 (1919); Liberty Cent. Trust Co. v. Greenbrier Coll. for Women, 50 F.2d 424, 429 (S.D. W. 
Va. 1931) (citing precedent), aff’d 283 U.S. 800; see also Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 
U.S. 18, 21 (1940) (holding that “[t]he Fifth Amendment does not entitle [the owner] to be paid in 
advance of the taking”) (quoting Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 (1932)). 
 266.  Therefore, in the case of S.B. County and any other California municipalities considering the 
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B.  Violation of Contract Clause? 
The federal Contract Clause prohibits state legislatures from passing any 
law “impairing the Obligation of Contract.”267  While there is an argument 
that the MRP proposal would violate this clause, there is mixed precedent on 
the issue—it is uncertain how successful such a challenge would be.  
Eminent domain proceedings often interfere with private contracts, but the 
U.S. Supreme Court has held that private property and contract rights must 
yield to legitimate use of state police power.268  In Midkiff, the Court held 
that “the Contract Clause has never been thought to protect against the 
exercise of the power of eminent domain.”269 
Interpretation of the U.S. Contract Clause has undergone a great deal of 
transformation over the years: it has gained and lost popularity in cycles.  
The clause was incorporated into the Constitution without record of much 
debate—its creation is “shrouded in mystery.”270  At the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, the Supreme Court applied the clause liberally; it held on 
multiple occasions that private contracts, in addition to contracts with the 
state, were protected by the Contract Clause from state interference.271 
Eventually, the Court began to carve out exceptions.  Most notably, and 
of most relevance here, was the exception for contracts violated through the 
exercise of certain sovereign functions, including eminent domain.272  In one 
case, the Court held that Vermont had not violated the Contract Clause when 
it condemned a toll bridge, the operation of which it had previously 
chartered to a private party.273  The Court noted that eminent domain is 
“paramount to all private rights vested under the government . . . and must 
yield in every instance to its proper exercise.”274 
 
plan, the restrictions expanded upon supra Part IV.C.2 would likely be determinative. 
 267.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 268.  See Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946). 
 269.  Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243 n.6 (1984). 
 270.  James W. Ely Jr., Whatever Happened to the Contract Clause?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 
371, 373 (2010) (quoting FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL 
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 271 (1985)). 
 271.  See, e.g., New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. 164, 167 (1812) (using the clause to protect tax-
exemption agreements); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 142–43 (1810) (using the clause to protect 
land grants). 
 272.  See W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848). 
 273.  Id. at 536. 
 274.  Id. at 532.  Although the decision appears to cut strongly in the county’s favor, the Court 
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In 1934, the Supreme Court further expanded the scope of this police 
power exception to the Contract Clause.  In Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. 
Blaisdell, the Court upheld a legislative moratorium on the foreclosure of 
mortgages created during the Great Depression.275  The parallels between 
Blaisdell and the MRP takings proposal are apparent (Blaisdell dealt with 
state interference with mortgage contracts during a time of financial 
depression); however, Blaisdell is also distinguishable due to the temporary 
nature of the state interference at issue.276   
By the 1940s, “[t]he advent of New Deal constitutionalism” and the rise 
of modern skepticism of federal regulation had “completed the effective 
destruction of Contract Clause jurisprudence.”277  But the Contract Clause 
had not been completely destroyed; the Supreme Court revisited the issue in 
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus.278  In that case, Justice Stewart, 
 
here did not consider the state to have condemned the contract, as California did in Oakland Raiders 
I and as S.B. County would do pursuant to the MRP proposal, but rather that the state had 
condemned the land, rendering the contract meaningless in the process.  Id. at 533.  This case would 
have been more comparable to the S.B. County proposal if the state had taken only the charter to use 
the bridge, and operated it in a way more conducive to the “public good.”  Justice McLean directly 
addressed this in his concurring opinion: 
No State could resume a charter, under the power of appropriation, and carry 
on the functions of the corporation.  A bank charter could not be thus taken, 
and the business of the bank continued for public purposes.  Nor could this 
bridge have been taken by the State, and kept up by it, as a toll-bridge.  This 
could not be called an appropriation of private property to public purposes.  
There would be no change in the use, except the application of the profits, and 
this would not bring the act within the power.  The power must not only be 
exercised bona fide by a State, but the property, not its product, must be 
applied to public use. 
Id. at 537 (McLean, J., concurring).  This precisely demonstrates the difference between 
extinguishing a mortgage in the process of condemning a house and simply condemning the 
mortgage itself, the former supported by Justice McLean’s analysis and the latter forbidden.  See id. 
 275.  290 U.S. 398, 447–48 (1934). 
 276.  The Court noted that: 
Whatever doubt there may have been that the protective power of the state, its 
police power, may be exercised—without violating the true intent of the 
provision of the Federal Constitution—in directly preventing the immediate 
and literal enforcement of contractual obligations by a temporary and 
conditional restraint, where vital public interests would otherwise suffer, was 
removed by our decisions relating to the enforcement of provisions of leases 
during a period of scarcity of housing. 
Id. at 440. 
 277.  Ely, supra note 270, at 391–92. 
 278.  438 U.S. 234 (1978). 
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delivering the opinion of the Court, addressed the decline in the Clause’s use 
over the preceding decades: 
     Although it was perhaps the strongest single 
constitutional check on state legislation during our early 
years as a Nation, the Contract Clause receded into 
comparative desuetude with the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and particularly with the development of the 
large body of jurisprudence under the Due Process Clause 
of that Amendment in modern constitutional history.  
Nonetheless, the Contract Clause remains part of the 
Constitution.  It is not a dead letter.  And its basic contours 
are brought into focus by several of this Court’s 20th-
century decisions. 
     . . . . 
     If the Contract Clause is to retain any meaning at all, 
however, it must be understood to impose some limits upon 
the power of a State to abridge existing contractual 
relationships, even in the exercise of its otherwise 
legitimate police power.279 
The Court addressed the holding in Blaisdell and indicated that the 
decision “clearly implied that if the . . . moratorium . . . had not possessed 
the characteristics attributed to it by the Court, it would have been invalid 
under the Contract Clause of the Constitution.”280  The Court then went on to 
examine the holdings of a number of other post-Blaisdell Contract Clause 
cases.281 
Particularly relevant to the MRP takings proposal, the Allied Steel Court 
 
 279.  Id. at 241–42 (footnotes omitted). 
 280.  Id. at 242. 
 281.  Id. at 243–44.  See, e.g., Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass’n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936) (holding a 
Louisiana law that modified existing withdrawal rights of building and loan association members as 
invalid under the Contract Clause); W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934) (holding an 
Arkansas law that exempted the proceeds of a life insurance policy from collection by the 
beneficiary’s judgment creditors to be invalid under the Contract Clause since it was not reasonably 
and definitively tailored to address a severe, temporary emergency for the purpose of furthering the 
general welfare). 
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cited W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh,282 in which the Court held that 
“‘[e]ven when the public welfare is invoked as an excuse’ . . . the security of 
a mortgage cannot be cut down ‘without moderation or reason or in a spirit 
of oppression.’”283  The Allied Steel Court also cited United States Trust Co. 
v. New Jersey, in which the Court recognized that: 
[A]lthough the absolute language of the Clause must leave 
room for the essential attributes of sovereign power, . . . 
necessarily reserved by the States to safeguard the welfare 
of their citizens, that power has limits when its exercise 
effects substantial modifications of private contracts.  
Despite the customary deference courts give to state laws 
directed to social and economic problems, [l]egislation 
adjusting the rights and responsibilities of contracting 
parties must be upon reasonable conditions and of a 
character appropriate to the public purpose justifying its 
adoption.284 
After reviewing these cases, the Allied Steel Court held that “[t]he 
severity of the impairment measures the height of the hurdle the state 
legislation must clear,” and that “[s]evere impairment . . . will push the 
inquiry to a careful examination of the nature and purpose of the state 
legislation.”285  This checkered history renders Contract Clause arguments 
somewhat unpredictable at the federal level.  While the Allied Steel case is 
said to have revitalized the modern treatment of the Contract Clause after the 
“near-fatal punch”286 delivered by Blaisdell, these cases are distinguishable.  
Allied Steel dealt with simple contract modification through legislative 
action, not contract destruction as a result of eminent domain.287  The West 
River Bridge Co.288 case, on the other hand, did deal with an eminent domain 
 
 282.  W.B. Worthen Co. ex rel. Bd. of Comm'rs of St. Imp. Dist. No. 513 of Little Rock, Ark. v. 
Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935).   
 283.  Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 243 (quoting Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. at 60 (1935)). 
 284.  Id. at 244 (quoting U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 12 (1977) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
 285.  Id. at 245. 
 286.  Ely, supra note 270, at 388. 
 287.  Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 246 (the legislative act “retroactively modif[ied]” 
back pension payments and “chang[ed] the company’s obligations”). 
 288.  W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848). 
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proceeding, albeit one involving real property that affected a contract  in a 
merely consequential manner.289 
The strongest argument for finding that the Contract Clause will prohibit 
the MRP proposal comes from the historical function of the clause: 
[The Contract Clause] was made part of the Constitution to 
remedy a particular social evil—the state legislative 
practice of enacting laws to relieve individuals of their 
obligations under certain contracts—and thus was intended 
to prohibit States from adopting ‘as [their] policy the 
repudiation of debts or the destruction of contracts or the 
denial of means to enforce them.’290 
Although S.B. County framed the MRP proposal as an eminent domain 
proceeding with a “voluntary” contract modification, the expressly stated 
purpose of the legislative action was, at its core, to relieve citizens of debt— 
“lower principal balance.”291  This was never the purpose of the eminent 
domain proceedings in Midkiff or the other twentieth century Contract 
Clause cases, and the fact that it is the goal of the MRP proposal may be the 
most important distinction.292 
At the very least, the Contract Clause will place the proposal under an 
additional level of scrutiny and will keep the door open for independent 
federal review of the issue.  The decision in Allied Steel suggests that even if 
the MRP proposal is found to be a legitimate exercise of state power, and 
within the bounds of state and federal takings clauses, it could still be invalid 
under the Contract Clause; indeed, all of the cases above also dealt with 
otherwise legitimate uses of state power that were invalidated on Contract 
 
 289.  Id.  The Vermont legislature used eminent domain to condemn a bridge, necessarily 
impairing and destroying a franchise agreement between the bridge’s owner and its operator.  Id. at 
516. 
 290.  Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 256 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 439 (1934)). 
 291.  MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, supra note 56. 
 292.  For an expanded discussion on the S.B. County takings proposal and the relevance of the 
historical purpose of the Contract Clause, see Examining California County’s Controversial 
Proposal to Use Eminent Domain to Provide Relief for Underwater Homeowners, AMERICAN 
BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE (July 26, 2012), http://news.abi.org/podcasts/118-examining-california-
countys-controversial-proposal-to-use-eminent-domain-to-provide-re. This podcast features 
commentary by Pepperdine School of Law Professor, and former American Bankruptcy Institute 
Resident Scholar, Mark S. Scarberry.  
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Clause grounds alone.293 
C.  Violation of Commerce Clause? 
Another clause of the U.S. Constitution worth considering in this 
analysis is the Commerce Clause.  This clause expressly grants to Congress 
the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States.”294  In addition to granting this express power, the Commerce 
Clause has traditionally been read to include a “dormant” clause implicitly 
forbidding the States from enacting legislation that restricts or imposes upon 
such interstate commerce, even in areas in which Congress has yet to 
legislate.295 
Adopting this interpretation, the Commerce Clause could have blocked 
the MRP proposal, even without express Congressional action, if adopting 
the proposal would “regulate those phases of the national commerce which, 
because of the need of national uniformity, demand that their regulation, if 
any, be prescribed by a single authority.”296  By taking mortgages, the 
condemning government entities may burden national—and even 
international—securities markets by devaluing the securitized interest in 
those mortgages.297  In its report analyzing the current financial crisis, the 
FCIC determined that such a lack of national uniformity was a major 
contributor to the collapse of the housing market.298 
The Commerce Clause is most easily applied to state laws that are 
genuinely “protectionist” in nature—laws that aim to economically isolate 
the state.299  The MRP proposal clearly did not fit into this category of 
 
 293.  See supra note 279 and accompanying text. 
 294.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 295.  See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Ariz. ex rel Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767–68 (1945) (“Whether or not 
[the restriction on state regulation of interstate commerce] is predicated upon the implications of the 
[C]ommerce [C]lause itself, or upon the presumed intention of Congress, where Congress has not 
spoken, the result is the same.”) (citations omitted).  The Dormant Commerce Clause has an 
extensive history, first recognized by the Court in Gibbons v. Ogden.  22 U.S. 1 (1824).  The validity 
of a state law that interferes with an area in which Congress has already acted, on the other hand, is 
best discussed in terms of the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 296.  S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 767. 
 297.  See Letter from SIFMA, supra note 95, at 2.  SIFMA asserts that the proposal will create 
valuation issues for the “complex contractual arrangements traded in national and international 
markets.”  Id. 
 298.  See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
 299.  See City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1978); see also Chem. Waste 
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commercial burden: it would not have actually “regulated” the flow of 
commerce; rather, the MRP proposal addressed local interests and only 
would have affected interstate commerce incidentally.300  The Court has 
adopted a more flexible approach in such cases: it will allow statutes that 
have this kind of incidental effect on commerce “unless the burden imposed 
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits.”301  The question becomes, therefore, not whether there is an effect 
on interstate commerce, but to what degree—“the extent of the burden that 
will be tolerated will . . . depend on the nature of the local interest involved, 
and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on 
interstate activities.”302 
This test was used in the context of eminent domain, coincidentally, in 
the remanded Court of Appeal hearing of the City of Oakland v. Oakland 
Raiders case.303  After the California Supreme Court held that intellectual 
 
Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 339, 348 (1992) (finding that an additional fee on out-of-state 
waste products violated the Commerce Clause); H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 
544–45 (1949) (invalidating a state law for burdening interstate commerce in order to promote its 
own economic advantages). 
 300.  The JPA could only have condemned mortgages on homes located within the boundaries of 
its member municipalities.  See supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text (outlining the JPA’s 
authority). 
 301.  Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see also City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 
437 U.S. at 623–24. 
 302.  Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.  However, slight interference with securities transactions at the state 
level is usually constitutional—statutes requiring registration statements to be filed in-state, for 
example, are permissible “blue sky laws.”  69A AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation—State § 6 (2013) 
(exploring the constitutionality of state securities regulations); see also Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & 
Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917) (upholding a Michigan statute that, among other things, required licensing 
to sell corporate stock); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917) (upholding similar statutes in 
Ohio). 
  The actual condemnation and revaluation of securities, however, seems to reach further than 
most of the burdens in these cases, and remains constitutionally untested.  These decisions reflect the 
pre-Depression era preference against federal regulation of securities.  About the SEC: What We Do, 
SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).  Following the 1929 
stock market crash, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (which created the SEC), radically altering the federal government’s involvement in the 
securities industry.  Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77a–aa (the Securities Act of 1933); 15 U.S.C. § 78a–
pp (the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).  These acts so shifted the balance between federal and 
state authority over securities law that court decisions predating them provide little guidance in 
predicting the modern outcome. 
 303.  Oakland Raiders II, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (Ct. App. 1985); see supra notes 136–54 and 
accompanying text (discussing Oakland Raiders I, 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982)).  Because Oakland 
Raiders II was heard by the California Court of Appeal, this interpretation of the federal Commerce 
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property was subject to eminent domain to the same extent as other property, 
the case was remanded to the lower courts to determine whether Oakland’s 
eminent domain action was in fact a valid exercise of power.304  The case 
ultimately hinged on the federal Commerce Clause argument raised by the 
Raiders.305  The court held that professional football was such a nationwide 
business and so completely involved in interstate commerce that acquiring a 
franchise by eminent domain would “impermissibly burden interstate 
commerce.”306  The court found that the local public interest in this action—
including social welfare and economic benefits—was not compelling 
enough to outweigh the burden imposed on interstate commerce.307 
So, the balancing test analysis proposed in Pike and applied in Oakland 
Raiders II requires that the burden on interstate commerce created by the 
MRP proposal not outweigh the local benefits it provides.308  If professional 
football is so intermingled with interstate commerce that condemning a 
franchise violates the Commerce Clause, it seems very likely that state 
action affecting the mortgage industry would also prove unconstitutional, if 
only because mortgages are traded on a national and international basis.309  
 
Clause would be binding precedent on the MRP proposal as utilized in S.B. County, or anywhere 
else in California. 
 304.  See supra notes 136–54. 
 305.  Oakland Raiders II, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 158.  Interestingly, the constitutionality of intangible 
property condemnations that incidentally burdens interstate commerce appears to be a novel 
question, first addressed by the Oakland Raiders II court here.  Id. at 156. 
 306.  Id. at 156–57.  The court found a recent California Supreme Court case dealing with 
interstate commerce and the NFL supported this view.  See Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football 
Co., 668 P.2d 674 (Cal. 1983). 
 307.  Oakland Raiders II, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 158.  The court determined that the Commerce Clause 
violation obviated the need to even consider the public use requirement.  Id. 
 308.  Supra note 302–03 and accompanying text. 
 309.  The federal interest in securities-based investment companies is demonstrated by, among 
other things, the treatment of these companies in the Securities Act and the Security Exchange Act.  
See supra note 302.  For example, the Securities Exchange Act protects these companies from 
certain acts of state interference, on the theory that these investment companies are “affected with a 
national public interest,” and that: 
[T]he activities of such companies, extending over many States, their use of 
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce and the wide geographic 
distribution of their security holders, make difficult, if not impossible, 
effective State regulation of such companies in the interest of investors. 
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(a), (a)(5) (2012) (emphasis added).  The congressional 
intent expressed in these regulations suggests that the MBSs that contain S.B. County’s mortgages 
might also be “affected with a national public interest”—by involuntarily revaluing such securities 
through the condemnation of mortgages, municipalities like S.B. County might be stepping on the 
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While the burden created by each individual taking may seem insignificant, 
the nature of mortgages—regulation of the housing industry, roles of the 
GSEs, nationally controlled interest rates, etc.—suggest that this sort of 
action could have serious effects that impermissibly extend beyond the 
borders of the state. 
VI.  IMPLICATIONS 
While the squabbles of local politicians might not seem to warrant the 
level of attention currently garnered,310 this debate did in fact have 
widespread significance, both legally and practically.  Judicial approval of 
the MRP proposal would likely have redefined our legal understanding of 
state sovereignty, intangible property rights, and the economic direction of 
the post-housing-crisis world.  The unanswered, and perhaps unanswerable, 
question remaining today is whether the dire consequences of enacting the 
MRP proposal outweigh those of not acting at all. 
The true danger, in the eyes of MRP’s opponents,311 lies not in the legal 
precedent set by the proposal, but in its more practical implications—the 
financial and economic consequences of using eminent domain to take 
mortgages.312  In its Federal Register notice,313 the FHFA cited as paramount 
its fear that programs like MRP’s would make credit less available to new 
potential homeowners, as well as to potential investors.314  The 
“unquantifiable new risk” of municipal use of eminent domain on mortgages 
will force mortgage originators to retool their lending policies.315  The 
mortgage industry claims that these eminent domain proposals will result in 
significant loss to originators, providing them with less funding for 
extending future credit and forcing them to “underwrite in a defensive 
manner.”316  The citizens of the taking municipalities will ultimately bear the 
 
toes of the federal government.  See id. 
 310.  Countless national media outlets have covered S.B. County’s handling of the mortgage crisis 
in recent months, from the Los Angeles Times, supra notes 13, 97, to the New Yorker, supra note 37. 
 311.  Most notably SIFMA, see supra note 95 and accompanying text, and the FHFA, see supra 
notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
 312.  See Letter from SIFMA, supra note 95. 
 313.  See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 314.  Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg. 47652 (Aug. 9, 
2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-08-09/pdf/2012-19566.pdf. 
 315.  Letter from SIFMA, supra note 95, at 2. 
 316.  Id. 
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burden of the plan—it will discourage mortgage originators from lending in 
these municipalities and make credit less accessible.317 
Taxpayers nationwide would also feel the losses caused by municipal 
mortgage takings through the extinguishing of federally held investment 
interest.  The FHFA expressed fears that municipalities might target 
mortgages in which GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac318 hold an 
investment interest.319  While MRP has never intended to take wholly owned 
GSE mortgages,320 the GSEs also own mortgage-backed securities secured 
by private mortgages.321  When a city or county takes property, they take it 
free and clear of any interest burdening it.322  Therefore, these “secured” 
mortgage interests in GSE investment portfolios, in addition to those in 
private investment funds across the globe,323 would simply disappear, 
saddling taxpayers with the loss.324 
The most dangerous consequences of the successful enactment of the 
 
 317.  Id.  However, politicians are already challenging the mortgage industry’s right to adjust its 
lending practices in this way.  See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 318.  GSEs are “privately held corporations with public purposes created by the U.S. Congress to 
reduce the cost of capital for certain borrowing sectors of the economy.”  Definition of ‘Government-
Sponsored Enterprise-GSE’, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gse.asp (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2014). 
 319.  Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg. at 47652. 
 320.  MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, supra note 56. 
 321.  At the time of their bailouts, “[t]he two GSEs . . . held between them ownership of, 
guarantees on, or securities backed by over half of the United States’ $12 trillion residential 
mortgages.”  Oesterle, supra note 16, at 733.  By owning securities backed by these mortgages, the 
GSEs would therefore have partial ownership interest in the mortgages in the securitization pool—
the very mortgage interest that would be subject to eminent domain in the MRP proposal.  See supra 
notes 256–58 and accompanying text. 
 322.  27 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 824 (2012).  See A.W. Duckett & Co. v. United States, 
266 U.S. 149, 151 (1924) (“[T]he accurate view would seem to be that such an exercise of eminent 
domain founds a new title and extinguishes all previous rights.”); Schoellkopf v. United States, 11 
Cl. Ct. 447, 450 (1987) (reaching the same conclusion). 
 323.  For example, the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks), which are also government-
sponsored entities, had amassed both GSE MBSs and PLS MBSs—the latter being the type targeted 
by the MRP plan.  FHFB OFFICE OF SUPERVISION, EXAMINATION MANUAL 2–3 (2007), available at 
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/2671/12.1%20Inv%20Port%20Mgmnt%20Narr-1.pdf.  For a more 
extensive explanation of the FHLBank system, see generally FHFB OFFICE OF SUPERVISION, FHFB 
EXAMINATION MANUAL (2007), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/2654/2.1%20Overview% 
20of%20the%20FHLBank%20System-1.pdf. 
 324.  But cf. Comment Letter from Mortgage Resolution Partners to FHFA, supra note 229, at 2 
(claiming that taxpayers will not suffer any loss and that the plan will actually benefit the GSEs, who 
will avoid the risk of future defaults). 
[Vol. 41: 633, 2014] Treading Water 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
683 
MRP proposal derive from the fact that it will likely be very profitable, 
creating a high incentive for other investors and municipalities to follow 
suit.  While MRP frequently mentions that it will take only a flat fee, the true 
value will come from the collateral retained by MRP’s investors: the 
condemned mortgages themselves.325  This means that in the event of 
homeowner default, MRP’s investors can foreclose on the home and collect 
its full value—a value that will likely have risen since they paid to condemn 
it.326  Like any successful business venture, there will be imitators and this 
will not be an isolated incident.  Before long, firms across the country will 
attempt to cash in on this lucrative strategy, investing money with cities and 
counties to fund condemnations.  Because the MRP plan hinges on 
independently acting municipalities, the end result will be countless cities 
and counties across the country condemning securitized mortgages by their 
own individual terms, resulting in the same lack of national uniformity 
blamed for contributing to the housing crisis in the first place.327 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
When the JSA voted to turn its attention away from the MRP proposal, 
the mortgage takings controversy seemed to have come to an end.  Mortgage 
Resolution Partners, however, still had faith in its proposed solution to the 
housing crisis and continued to encourage municipalities across California, 
and the nation, to consider turning to eminent domain as the solution to their 
housing woes.  MRP’s CEO, Steven Gluckstern, may have phrased it best: 
“[T]his is a marathon not a sprint, and we’re in the first few miles.”328  “[W]e 
have had lots of conversations . . . .  You’d like your first guy to have gotten 
there, but maybe he drops out of the race.”329 
Without a prominent community pursuing the plan, California courts 
seem to have lost the opportunity to place these complex legal issues under 
the judicial microscope.  The questions raised by the MRP proposal, 
however, will not likely go unanswered for long.  On September 11, 2013, 
 
 325.  FAQs, supra note 63. 
 326.  Current trends suggest home prices in S.B. County and California will continue to rise, not 
plummet.  See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
 327.  See supra note 298 and accompanying text. 
 328.  Ghori, Eminent Domain Rejected, supra note 104. 
 329.  Lazo, County Abandons Eminent Domain Mortgage Plan, supra note 97 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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the city council of Richmond, California voted four to three to move forward 
with a version of the MRP plan, making the city the likely site of the next 
phase of the mortgage takings proposal.330  Banks representing some of the 
nation’s largest bond investors have already fought back by filing for an 
injunction against the city (the case was dismissed on procedural grounds).331 
The MRP proposal suffers from a number of serious flaws that leave it 
vulnerable to challenges on the local, state, and federal levels.  MRP will 
continue to court struggling municipalities like S.B. County and Richmond.  
Inevitably, the issue will find its way into a courtroom and both sides of the 
debate will have the opportunity to plead their cases.  S.B. County’s 
flirtation with the MRP plan has set the stage for this future conflict—one 
that may prove to be among the most important eminent domain cases in 
recent memory. 
 
Michael S. Moskowitz* 
 
 
 330.  Christie, supra note 78.  Richmond’s adaptation of the plan allows the city to “invoke 
eminent domain if trusts for more than 620 delinquent and performing ‘underwater’ mortgages reject 
offers made by the city to buy the loans at deep discount . . . to refinance them and reduce their 
principal.”  Id. 
 331.  See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. City of Richmond, No. C 13-03663 CRB (N.D. Cal. 
dismissed Sept. 16, 2013), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/california/candce/3:2013cv03663/268907/78/0.pdf.  In the dismissal order, the district court 
judge held that it is not possible to determine the constitutionality of the Richmond proposal until the 
details of the plan are finalized.  Id. at 2 (“Ripeness of these claims does not rest on contingent future 
events certain to occur, but rather on future events that may never occur.  . . . [P]ut simply, there may 
never be a ‘final version.’”); see also Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Against Richmond, supra note 78.   
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